PEACE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY IN AFRICA
New challenges and new perspectives

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CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: AN ASSESSMENT AND NEW QUESTIONS AFTER 50 YEARS OF AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE

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SUMMARY

Since the independence processes in the African continent, armed conflicts, peace and security have been issues that have raised concern and attention both at domestic level and at international scale. In recent years, all aspects have undergone significant changes which have given rise to intense debate. On the one hand, the end of some historical conflicts, for example, in southern Sudan or Angola, has taken place in a context of slight decrease in the number of armed conflicts and the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes, opening the way to a more optimistic scenario than in the previous decades. Moreover, the African Union — especially since its re-launching in 2000— and some other African regional organizations (such as ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC) have staged an increasingly interventionist internal shift in matters related to peace and security, encouraged by the idea of promoting "African solutions to African problems". This new scenario, however, has been accompanied by new uncertainties and queries at the security level (development securitization and militarization, regression of the socioeconomic conditions in post-conflict contexts, impact of drug trafficking in regions like West Africa etc.) and major challenges at the operational level, especially for the African Union and regional organizations (inter-agency coordination, lack of resources, dilemmas related to the debate on "Responsibility to Protect", etc..). This article aims to ascertain the state of affairs on all these issues and raise some key questions to consider.

1. INTRODUCTION

Issues related to conflicts, peace and security in Africa have generated such a constant international debate in recent decades that other important political, economic or social aspects also taking place in the continent since its independent processes have been marginalized and obscured. Likewise, the prevailing discourse on these matters has been largely pessimistic. The persistence of armed violence in certain phases of the African postcolonial state, the regression of socio-economic indicators, or the poor democratic quality of many of these new states have often been judged from a standpoint invoking strictly endogenous factors such as the misbehaviour of African political elites, the impact of widespread corruption or the inability of African societies to adapt to the context of globalization. In this sense, the "Afro-pessimism" rhetoric has guided the interpretation of Africa's problems since its independences.

In the past two decades, however, this rhetoric, sometimes monolithic and reductionist, has been challenged by wider-range visions, which have incorporated other factors and dimensions to their analysis. This analysis, to which many African voices (universities, research centres, etc.) have contributed, is characterized by at least two elements. First, we believe that the evolution of postcolonial Africa must be contextualized within a historical and international context. The African political, social, economic and cultural processes should be interpreted based in the European legacy, the following cold war context, the security and development instruments and proposals submitted by the West and, finally, the current context of globalization. Including these elements to the analysis does not imply diminishing the importance of the endogenous elements, but to establish a framework of analysis much more complex and closer to reality. Secondly, it is understood that the negative image of Africa usually exported by the media is not in keeping with the positive evolution observed in recent years: the decline in the number of armed conflicts, the greater prominence of African actors in the management of their realities, or the official improvement of some governance indicators, to name a few. In that respect, the "Afro-pessimistic" evaluation since the independences does not seem so clear.

The following pages, structured in three different sections, are intended to contribute, with some facts and reflections and in a very descriptive way, to the purpose of assessing peace and security in Africa. In the first, we analyze the evolution of conflicts, peace processes and governance based on the different indicators and analysis carried out by specialized centres in recent years. The second part examines the emergence in the last decade of what has become known as "African peace and security architecture" (APSA) and the interventionist shift undertaken by institutions and African governments since then. We examine also their achievements and limitations, some of their dilemmas (such as the famous and controversial R2P principle, the "Responsibility to Protect") and their relationship with institutions like the European Union. Finally, the third section raises some key issues related to security, beyond the analysis of conflict, such as the debate on human security in Africa, the possible militarization process encouraged by initiatives such as the AFRICOM, or the potential impact of certain phenomena such as drug-trafficking on the security context of West African regions.

On the whole, the article discusses the difficulty of establishing a convincing or one way evaluation on peace and security matters, rejecting the determinism of the "Afro-pessimistic" rhetoric. Also, new scenarios, institutions and trends raise new questions and dilemmas that need to be analyzed and which need some kind of response.

2. ARMED CONFLICTS, PEACE PROCESSES AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: EVOLUTION AND ASSESSMENT BALANCE SINCE THE INDEPENDENCES

The following section discusses three important issues related to peace and security in Africa: *a*) the evolution of the number of major armed conflicts in Africa, which reveal a sharp decline in recent years, as well as tension and political instability situations; *b*) the existence of numerous peace and negotiation processes and significant local experiences in management and conflict resolution; and *c*) the evolution of the continent in terms of governance and democratization.

2.1. MAJOR ARMED CONFLICTS

Armed conflict has been a recurring reality in the analysis of postcolonial Africa. According to Lindemann (2008), since the 60s, a total of 24 sub-Saharan African countries (*i.e.*, almost 50% of African states) have suffered war, while 22 other countries have managed to "avoid it". "Freedom wars", "intractable wars", "proxy wars" (substitute wars or wars controlled from abroad, typical conflicts of the context of bipolar dispute) or "post-Cold War conflicts" have sparked a major review of its causes and consequences, sometimes very biased and reductionist, based on very different sources, methodologies and data.

Nevertheless, most sources agree that Africa has experienced a substantial decline in the number of "major armed conflicts" in recent years.[1] For example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) states that if in 1990 there were 11 "major armed conflicts" in Africa, this figure had dropped to just one in 2007 (Somalia). In total, this agency estimates that since the end of the Cold War a total of 14 armed conflicts can be counted in Africa, namely: Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo (for-

merly Zaire), Republic of the Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.[2] Some of these contexts, according to the cyclical dynamic of violence that often characterizes many armed conflicts, are still undergoing noteworthy episodes of violence, for example, the events of the last months of 2008 in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, or the serious situation in the Sudanese region of Darfur. Other conflicts appear to be nearing their closing stages, as is the case of Uganda, while the events taking place in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria also deserve special attention due to the periodic high levels of violence, destruction and fatalities reached.

Although we are aware that by referring only to the major armed conflicts we have left out other conflict situations on the continent, the fact is that this approach enables us to focus on the common characteristics of these conflicts. Although the vast majority are regarded as intrastate conflict type (except the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000), they are also highly regionalised conflicts. Similarly, they are conflicts occurring in contexts more and more internationalized and transnationalized. At different levels, not only at direct contenders level, a large number of actors are involved either in their management and / or resolution (UN, NGOs, etc.), either in their dynamics (third countries, private security companies, natural resource companies, etc.), creating complex networks linking local armed factions with actors of very different nature (Duffield, 2001). From this, it follows that the war in Africa has had an extremely significant humanitarian and socioeconomic impact. The estimations only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are that over five million people[3] may have died as a direct or indirect result of armed violence. In countries like Sierra Leone, almost half the population (about two million) were displaced due to armed clashes, while in Darfur the death toll since 2003 has been estimated in more than 300,000 people. Moreover, a recent report by IANSA, Oxfam International and Saferworld (2007) states that the continent has lost more than 300,000 million dollars as a result of wars in recent years. In short, a level of losses, direct and indirect victims, and an impact in terms of opportunity costs, transaction costs, impact on infrastructure, etc., which, *per se*, induces a more detailed analysis of the nature and impact of the armed conflicts in the continent.

Furthermore, although the data regarding the major armed conflicts shows this remarkable decline, there are some regions where the high levels of tension, violence and political and social instability deserve special attention. In that respect, in recent years, coups d'état (of varying intensity and consequence) have been staged in Chad, Central African Republic, Guinea-Conakry, Mauritania and Madagascar raising uncertain scenarios. There are also tensions linked to contexts of post-peace agreement, such as Burundi, Ivory Coast and Guinea-Bissau. On the other hand, countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe have been subjected to strong internal political disputes, sparking intense diplomatic activity on an international scale. Finally, we must also point out some territorial tensions which have given rise to confrontations, for example, between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, or between Chad and Sudan over the situation in Darfur. Other tensions (at times with heavy military activity) were linked to secessionist ambitions (such as the Casamance region in Senegal or Cabinda in Angola).

The narratives seeking to explain all these conflicts have often insisted on linking violence with issues such as identity (ethnic, religious, cultural), the scarcity or the abundance of natural resources, the extreme fragility and sometimes the collapse of the African postcolonial state, or the prevailing economic underdevelopment in many of these contexts. Without underestimating the explanatory power of each of these elements, many authors have challenged the mono-causal views and stressed the importance of developing complex analysis interrelating endogenous and exogenous factors of various kinds (Cramer, 2006; Francis, 2008). Also, a more complex analysis of armed conflicts has advocated increasing the visibility of peace and negotiation processes, often neglected and ignored.

2.2. PEACE PROCESSES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: LOCAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

Unsurprisingly, the increasing number of armed conflicts of any kind or political tensions with recurrent use of violence often take place in parallel to the negotiating situation. However, such contexts have not had as much prominence and visibility as the contexts of armed conflict. The reasons for this trend seem logical. The media have tended to overestimate the war over peace initiatives. Moreover, many of the initiatives or processes having received attention of some kind have usually been those led by international actors such the United Nations, to the detriment of organisations led by local actors such as civil society organizations, women organizations or the increasing importance in some countries of certain regional organizations.

The *Yearbook on peace processes*, prepared by the Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace) of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, for example, estimates that in 2009 there were a total of 17 peace processes or negotiations going on in Africa: Mali (with several Tuareg factions), Niger (the MNJ), Nigeria (the Niger Delta region), Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia (in the Ogaden and Oromia regions), Somalia, Darfur (Sudan), Burundi (with the FNL), Chad, Central African Republic, eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda (with the LRA) and the Western Sahara region (Fisas, 2010). Also, the last decade has witnessed the end of historical conflicts such as South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Liberia, thanks

to the participation of both international diplomacy as well as local and regional actors of a social and political character.

In the case of southern Sudan, for example, the diplomatic efforts of countries like Norway or the U.S., the role played by the regional organization IGAD, the political will of certain sectors of the parties in conflict (the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, led at the time by John Garang) or the crucial role played by some actors of civil society were decisive factors in the historic peace agreement signed in January 2005 which put an end to nearly three decades of armed conflict, after having caused two million fatal casualties and the same amount of persons displaced by violence. Currently, southern Sudan is going through a process that, despite its difficulties, is surpassing all expectations and meeting some of the agreements, such as the formation of a government of national unity, the formation of an autonomous government in the south, the recent elections, or the referendum on the issue of self-determination scheduled for the coming months. Another remarkable case is that of Sierra Leone, West Africa. In recent years, this conflict, which left a high death toll and a great number of displaced people, has managed to hold presidential, parliamentary and local elections and to normalize the internal operations of its institutions after decades of significant episodes of instability. The role played by some civil society organizations or certain groups such as women, journalists or interfaith groups in some phases of the conflict[4] has been highlighted as one of the factors which made possible the end of armed violence. Also, the role played by ECOWAS, an organization of West African countries, was also crucial in stabilizing the country and in bringing the hostilities to an end.[5] Finally, the literature analyzing the case of Somalia has also repeatedly emphasized the crucial role played by women's organizations or by the clans of elders in the various negotiation processes.

Along the active role of certain local actors in the negotiating process, the importance of the indigenous initiatives for conflict resolution, reconciliation and peacebuilding in many of these contexts has also been stressed. Far from providing a romantic vision and, therefore, highlighting its limitations and contradictions, Tim Murithi has analyzed the endogenous mechanisms for conflict resolution in contexts such as Nigeria (Tiv community), the Guurti system used to achieve stability in Somaliland (northern Somalia), the Mato Oput peacebuilding process between the community Acholi in northern Uganda, or the implementation of the Ubuntu concept in the reconciliation process in South Africa. For Murithi, the importance of these initiatives, as opposed sometimes to the exogenous mechanisms not rooted in the local world view, lies in their internal legitimacy, their inclusiveness and their ability to reach a consensus (Murithi, 2008). This issue has led to debates on reconciliation processes in countries like South Africa, Rwanda or Sierra Leone, where transitional justice measures of different kind have been put in place. While South Africa and Rwanda represent examples of a more restorative type of justice (with the experiences of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation or the implementation of the *gacaca* courts, respectively), the Special Court for Sierra Leone has opted, more controversially, for a punitive action, not so rooted in the local worldview and, according to the most critical voices, unhelpful and even harmful to the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding.[6]

In short, the visibility of peace processes and conflict resolution and the role played by local actors in these processes help to tone down the pessimistic and negative image of Africa. A negative image which, as discussed below, has also contributed to the persistence of essentially negative governance and democratization indicators.

2.3. GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION

In recent years, the research centres dedicated to the development of indicators measuring the quality of governance and democracy have proliferated. Africa has witnessed, in this regard and according to different indicators, a mixed trend. On the one hand, virtually most of African states have held democratic elections since the early 90s. In many cases, we find that such elections have taken place in three or even four consecutive occasions.[7] Moreover, most of the "international indices and indicators on governance" would place many of the African states to the tail end of performance in this regard. For example, the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International (CPI) includes ten African countries in the list of the top 20 countries with the highest corruption index in the world.[8] The "Fragile States Index" prepared by Brookings Global Economy and Development states that 22 of the 28 countries judged as "fragile states in a critical condition" and 13 of the 26 judged as "fragile states" are African countries.[9] However, the global data behind such indicators hides substantial differences in the different contexts and situations. Thus, according to the "Ibrahim Index for African Governance", countries like Mauritius, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Botswana and South Africa seem to show a very positive evolution in governance, closely followed by Namibia, Ghana, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe and Senegal.[10] On the other hand, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Angola, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Guinea-Conakry and Nigeria are the countries, according to that index, showing the poorest indicators.[11] In short, regional generalizations are difficult, or at least not appropriate. Also, many of these indices have been challenged and toned down alleging their sometimes biased, ethnocentric and general nature (Francis, 2008: 7).

Moreover, it should be noted that in recent years, the African Union (AU) has launched two major initiatives to address issues related to governance and democratization in Africa. On the one hand, the African Peer

Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument through which countries voluntarily undergo a process of self-assessment divided into several phases and structured around four main axes: i) democracy and political governance; ii) economic governance and management, iii) corporate governance, and iv) socio-economic development. 29 of the 53 African states have joined.[12] The APRM has begun to operate and 13 countries so far have been evaluated: Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Algeria, South Africa, Benin, Uganda, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Mozambique, and more recently, Lesotho and Mauritius. This initiative is part of the process of the so-called New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). While this initiative has sparked a major international attention, it has also been criticized for the lack of involvement of some African leaders in the whole process.[13] A second domestic initiative is known as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Adopted by the AU in January 2007, its purpose is to deepen the commitment of its members to democratic principles, elections, the rule of the law and the respect for human rights.[14] Welcomed by the international community, this initiative has also been challenged because of "the vagueness of its terms"[15] or its "slow ratification" by members of the AU.[16] Thus, both initiatives account for the will of African institutions and governments to emphasize governance and democratization and stress the limitations of such proposals, as we shall see in the development of APSA.

In short, the evolution of armed conflicts, peace and negotiation processes, or the level of governance and democratization in Africa in recent decades has not been necessarily negative. Against the Afro-pessimistic rhetoric, other rhetorics have sought, on one hand, to use more complex and contextual analysis and, on the other, to increase the visibility of other positive realities in which logically the local initiatives are highlighted. With this background, the problems in the medium and long term are related to the evolution of some very complex contexts of conflict such as Darfur, Somalia or, more generally, to the situation in the Great Lakes, or to highly instable situations such as Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe, to name just a few. In terms of governance, the key questions revolve around the actual contribution of the electoral processes to the stabilization and following democratization in some contexts, the impact of instruments like the APRM and the African Charter on the consolidation of certain processes, or the type of participation and coordination of the African and international political and social actors initiatives of this kind.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF AN "AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE" (APSA): ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION, SHORTFALLS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

The events of the last decade have been a turning point in terms of peace and security as far as Africa is concerned. The next section will discuss: *a*) the rhetoric, actions and institutions appeared in the recent years and shaping what is known as "African peace and security architecture" (APSA); *b*) the historical and controversial debate on the principle of sovereignty and the right to interfere in Africa, currently organized around the notion of "Responsibility to Protect" and included in the AU Charter; and *c*) the European Union's role in the whole process of preparing and developing the APSA.

3.1. THE "AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE" (APSA)

Since its re-launching in 2001, the AU has adopted a much more ambitious approach regarding the issues of peace and security on the continent. The dilemmas raised by the principle of sovereignty and interference have been superseded by a *a priori* more interventionist commitment and by the conviction that "African solutions to African problems" should be provided. In the past few years, this attitude has been reflected by the presence of the AU and some African regional organizations in a number of "peacekeeping" operations in the continent. The pioneering operations of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 90s have been joined by other agencies such as the Community of Central African States (ECCAS) who sent the MICOPAX (the former FOMUC) to the Central African Republic, or ECOWAS to Ivory Coast. As the AU, it is worth noting the missions to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (MIOC), Somalia (AMISOM) and Darfur (UNAMID), the latter in coordination with the United Nations.

This process is framed within the articulation of the "African peace and security architecture" (APSA) of the AU. APSA accounts for the different elements implemented (or currently developing) by the AU and other regional agencies to consolidate peacekeeping and security efforts in the continent. The structure includes: a policy-making body (the Peace and Security Council, PCS); a centre for analysis and data collection (the Continental Early Warning System, CEWS); two military structures (the African Standby Force, ASF, and the Military Staff Committee, MSC); an advisory body of outside mediation (the Panel of the Wise); and a special fund to finance the operations (the Peace Fund). Its consolidation has some political and financial limitations. On the one hand, there is some lack of cohesion, which reduces the scope of the peace and security agenda, thus acknowledging that intervention in internal conflicts remains a deeply sensitive and controversial issue. Also, the political divisions lead to the fear, expressed by some experts, that the Peace and Security Council might become another Security Council. On the other hand, the political obstacles must add to the financial problems related to logistics and deployment capabilities, clearly shown in missions such as Darfur and Somalia.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the African Standby Force (ASF) are two of the major instruments of the APSA. The former stands as a "decision-making body for conflict prevention, management and resolution". In its founding charter, the PSC was established as a mechanism of collective security and early warning systems that should provide timely and effective response to situations of crisis and conflict in Africa, and which could propose the external intervention, should the PSC deem it necessary. The Council consists of 15 members, five of them elected for three year terms. Some of its main objectives are: i) promoting peace, security and stability in Africa; ii) the prevention of conflicts; iii) promoting the activities of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction; iv) the coordination of efforts to fight terrorism; v) the development of a common defence policy for the AU, and vi) the strengthening of democratic practices, good governance, human rights or fundamental freedoms protection.

The ambition of the ASF is to become the military intervention and rapid reaction force of the AU for 2010. The ASF plans to have about 15,000 troops, divided into five regional units (West, Central, Horn of Africa, east and south). The brigades would have a military component and a civilian component (including police), as is usual in modern peace operations. Its mandate would provide for various functions in the area of support to peace operations (election observation and monitoring, supervision of the disarmament and demobilization, etc.). While there has been some progress in this regard, so far only one of five sub regional brigades has been created according to schedule, mainly due to financial or operational problems. Therefore, there is very little to suggest that this force will be fully operational and ready to mobilize the military strength attributed to it by the scheduled date. It is also assumed that these interventions should be coordinated with the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (REC) and seek to supplement rather than replace the existing regional intervention efforts.

APSA has received substantial support from the international community. For various reasons, Africa has aroused a specific interest in the peace and international security agenda. The EU has been particularly active in supporting all of this architecture. In this regard, it is worth noting the instrument known as African Peace Facility (APF), created in 2003 by the EU for the financing of peacekeeping operations in Africa. To that effect, it has received an initial allocation of 250 million Euros (mostly for AMIS), an amount which, in its second phase (2008-2010), has been increased to 300 million. The funds are directly managed by African personnel, in line with its three fundamental principles: i) "ownership"; ii) promotion of African solidarity; and iii) creating the conditions for development.[17] The EU has also kept the Instrument for Stability (IfS), intended primarily for mediation efforts and the strengthening of the regional capacities for peacekeeping. The IfS includes a crisis response component (100 million Euros) and a component of long-term response (40 million) planned to fight the existence of regional threats. On the other hand, the EU has contributed logistical support through the mechanisms of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The civil-military operation in support of AMIS II in Darfur in 2005 reflected this policy.

Finally, it is true that EU member states have been more reluctant than before to send troops as part of UN missions, especially taking into account the experiences of the first half of the 90s in Somalia or Rwanda. Nevertheless, the development of military missions led by the EU suggests that this body will continue to have a specific weight in these matters. In this regard, four of the 16 operational missions in Africa are coordinated by the EU: The EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau, the EUPOL and EUSEC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the EUFOR Chad / RCA, which in 2008 handed over the control of its operations to the United Nations (MINURCAT II) and whose strength (about 3,000 personnel) has been incorporated into the new mission.[18]

3.2. THE DEBATE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AFRICA

The "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) is established as the "the principle that sovereign states and, when they fail, the international community as a whole have a responsibility to protect civilians from massive human right abuses".[19] The general opinion is that the states have the "shared responsibility" to protect their citizens and help other states to be able to do so. For the international organizations, including United Nations, R2P means the responsibility to issue warnings, generate effective prevention strategies and, where necessary, to mobilize an effective response. Finally, for the civil society and individuals, it means the responsibility to put some pressure on the decision makers to decide what should be done, by whom and when.

The R2P is framed within the controversial debate about the events in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo during the 90s, a debated which opposed those in favour of establishing a "right to humanitarian intervention" and those arguing in defence of the principle of sovereignty recognized by the UN Charter. In this regard, R2P stands as a concept seeking to give an answer to this debate. R2P's origins date back to the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*[20], which became the major issue in the recommendations of the High-Level Panel of the United Nations, *A More Secure World* in 2004,[21] and in the report of UN Secretary General, *In Larger Freedom*, a year later.[22] At the UN World Summit in September 2005, the heads of state, unanimously, accepted the concept, also acknowledged by the UN Security Council as a

general principle. In February 2008, United Nations appointed a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, with the primary mandate to develop and reach a consensus on the concept.[23] A final document which has contributed to this process is the January 2009 report of UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, which delves into some of the elements in this regard.[24]

The 2001 report, *The Responsibility to Protect* establishes a set of principles and core elements. Firstly, it believes that "where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect". Second, the foundations of R2P rely on: the obligations inherent to the concept of sovereignty; the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; the specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; and the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself. Third, the responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: i) the responsibility to prevent; ii) the responsibility to react; and iii) the responsibility to rebuild. Fourth, the R2P establishes prevention as a priority. Finally, the R2P establishes a series of principles in the exceptional case of a military intervention, the last option in certain situations (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing).

The AU Charter implicitly includes R2P's concept and rhetoric. In this regard, the Peace and Security Council can assess potential crisis situations, send reconnaissance missions and legitimize the AU's intervention in internal crisis situations. Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act legitimizes "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity". Furthermore, Article 4 (j) states "the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security". In particular, Article 7 (e) of the *Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* states that the Council may "recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments".[25] Indeed, a substantive difference between the Protocol of the AU and the OAU Charter. With the adoption of these legal measures, for the first time in the history of Africa, the continental organization has the authority to intervene in domestic affairs in any situation where atrocities against minority groups or communities at risk may appear to be committed. In other words, the AU has the right and responsibility to protect (Murithi, 2007). The establishment of the ASF for 2010 should be framed within that final purpose.

AU's deployment of the missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia is, somehow, a first attempt to operationalize R2P. Some even believe that the hybrid model proposed in Darfur with the UNAMID (AU-UN) defines the horizon of that implementation, which would combine foreign and local participation.[26] However, the implementation of this principle in the African continent has given rise to many problems. To the logistic and institutional limitations mentioned above implied by, for example, carrying out operations in a context of the extent of Darfur, we must add the controversy surrounding a still emerging debate which has raised a large controversy. Indeed, for some, the possible failure in Darfur lies, among other issues, in the inadequate conceptualization of R2P, in the expectations born out of the idea that physical protection is, in fact, possible within the limits of a military force, or in the confusing advocacy of this principle (De Waal, 2007). In addition, the debate on "Responsibility to Protect" in Africa is, for many, a dispute closely connected to the respect of the principle of sovereignty and to the power balances and imbalances in the current international scene.

3.3. THE APSA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Lisbon Summit of December 2007 marked a turning point in the relations between the EU and the African continent, when an agreement was reached on what is known as "Africa-EU Joint Strategy". This document represents a *de facto* global roadmap for the relations between the two organizations in the coming years. The Action Plan of the Strategy for 2008-2010 identifies several strategic priorities in the areas of peace and security, democratic governance, human rights, trade and regional integration among others. Both parties have agreed to implement these priority actions in the context of specific "Partnerships". Each of these eight partnerships is open to the participation of a wide range of stakeholders, ranging from the EU and AU Commissions or the Councils of Ministers of both bodies to Member States, decentralized agencies and civil society organizations, among many others.[27]

More precisely, the main purpose of the "Partnership for Peace and Security" is to strengthen the mechanisms that should allow both organizations the opportunity to "respond timely and adequately to security threats, and also to join efforts in addressing global challenges".[28] There are "three priority actions" foreseen for this partnership: i) an enhanced dialogue on challenges for peace and security; ii) support the "full operationalization" of the APSA, reinforcing some of its principal mechanisms such as the Continental

Early Warning System or the African Standby Force, and iii) ensure the financial viability of the AU and its regional mechanisms in the task of planning and conducting peace operations in Africa. To achieve these objectives, the paper argues, among other measures, for the strengthening of dialogue at political and technical level (in particular, between the PSC of the AU and the Political and Security Committee of the EU), giving support to the instruction and training of the African military, or the creation of sustainable financing mechanisms.

The launch of this partnership also includes the creation of joint working groups between the AU and the EU, as well as with other organizations such as the UN and NATO. While some of these measures are already under operation, the strategy so far has suffered several delays. Among other reasons, these delays are due to the discrepancies of interests and perspectives within the EU regarding Africa (amongst countries heavily involved in the continent, such as France, and others without any experience or tradition in this regard) and to the AU problems to allocate human and material resources to this project. With regard to capacity building and training of African military, the noteworthy French program EURORECAMP, which since 2007 is being managed at European level in everything related to training at the strategic level. France continues to manage the training of officers for peacekeeping operations through RECAMP, the programs of which are open to countries and institutions wishing to give support (Spain, in fact, has been involved with logistical support in RECAMP cycles IV and V).[29]

Moreover, the implementation of all sections of the Strategy, including the section relative to the APSA, has been one of the priorities of the last EU presidencies. However, after the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty some questions have emerged as to whether other priorities might affect the practical implementation of "Partnership for Peace and Security". It is widely believed that although the EU has strengthened its support to peace and security issues in Africa, it should commit itself to a longer term and take concrete steps to do so, for example, the appointment of a EU representative in the headquarters of the AU, Addis Ababa.

In short, in the last decade the notion of "African solutions to African problems" has influenced the emergence and gradual consolidation of an African architecture of peace and security *a priori* more interventionist but also facing major problems and arousing fundamental debates. Political, logistical or operational constraints or the coordination and complementarity problems between African governments and regional or international agencies show some of the difficulties that APSA could face in the coming years. In addition, the participation of social actors in all these processes or the role that the debate on human security, rather than the traditional safety, could play are issues appearing to be crucial in the context of peacebuilding and security on the African continent.

4. CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE: NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

We cannot ignore, on the other hand, the concern about some issues stemming from the so-called new agenda, or more properly, from the increasing and explicit convergence of security views and commitments —national and international—, development (including democratization and governance) and peace. Specifically, we will briefly introduce the general framework and, selecting some of the topics that may generate research agendas and themes of debate, we will focus on: *a*) one aspect of the relationship between security and development, namely the "securitization" and militarization of development, in particular the priority given to the reform of the security sector and to the emergence of initiatives such as Africom; and *b*) the new continental security challenges as those posed by drug trafficking and illegal drug trade, in particular in West Africa.

These are simple sketches allowing us to draw some conclusions and raise questions for debate. Before, however, we should remember the context in which we have inserted them, the convergence of peace, security and development, and the securitization of development agendas, particularly after September 11, 2001.

4.1. THE CONTEXT: CONVERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

It should be remembered, contextually, that the post-Cold War has changed many things, particularly regarding the relationship between security, peace and development. To put it succinctly, the bipolar world did establish a clear separation between security policies and development policies, although both were included, with different emphasis, in the United Nations Charter. In parallel, albeit separately, two political and institutional architectures were designed, one for managing the socio-economic development issues of the states, and the other, for peace and security, a situation which prevailed after the widespread African independences in the early 60s.

The idea of development was associated exclusively to the economic development of the states. Poverty, social exclusion, hunger, respect for civil and political rights were domestic issues that states had to face by themselves with the only help of other countries cooperation for the development, the multilateral agencies and, in extreme cases, of humanitarian aid. The promotion of economic welfare and the task of ensuring the basic needs of the populations fell to the sovereign states, which could seek outside support from

the Bretton Woods institutions, multilateral and bilateral donor agencies and from UN specialized agencies.

Security issues, meanwhile, had a very limited agenda, focusing on the protection of territorial integrity, the defence of sovereignty and the promotion of the states' national interests, always in the context of the bipolar rivalry between East and West, and often under the even more restrictive and exclusively military prism of the national security paradigm. Thus, under realistic assumptions, security revolved around the power of the two major defence and security organizations in each of the blocks. These countries used to determine the security doctrines, the development of new security institutions and policy instruments, the threat perception, the level of military mobilization, etc.

In brief, although in the academic world peace, security and development were separate dimensions with little, if any, dialogue between them, a relationship between security and development could be detected, as early as under Truman's presidency, which in the U.S. case revealed among other things the "Alliance for Progress". Later, during the 80s, a new conception of peace, security and development emerged gradually: security and development were conceived as multidimensional processes whose ultimate goals should be the welfare and safety of the citizens and, lastly, with plural actors (private and public) and different instruments, not only military (security) and economic (development). The relationship between security and development, in the post-Cold War and the "new" violent armed conflicts context, will redefine itself in this context, a process which will culminate with the emergence of the concept of "peacebuilding" understood as a comprehensive framework for the peace, security and development agendas (Grasa, 2010). Suffice it to say that all this was done because two major problems occupied the international political agenda: globalization and the "new wars", *i.e.*, the new armed conflicts and the faces of violence, particularly domestic and occurring in low capacity states.[30]

A turning point, with great impact on the reformulation of the security-development nexus, occurs precisely after the September 11 attacks and the "global war on terror." The immediate result: development, aid and cooperation policies are contingent on an increasingly narrow security agenda led by anti-terrorist objectives (Duffield, 2001). In this context, to which other threats such as drug trafficking will be added, the priority will be given to political stability objectives, to the geographic and thematic reallocation of aid flows, and to the great debates about human security, complex humanitarian emergencies, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, to the responsibility to protect or to the potentially threatening role of "fragile states" (Mateos 2010). Precisely, this is the context in which we place our comments in terms of future concerns.

4.2. CONVERGENCE OF AGENDAS, HUMAN SECURITY, SECURITIZATION AND NEW THREATS IN AFRICA

All these issues have entered with force the African agenda for peace, security and governance, both in the theoretical aspect and, in particular, in the practical aspect. They have generated interesting debates reaching beyond the generic and critical aspects to the "liberal peacebuilding consensus" or beyond the link between the regression of human development indicators and the debate about the limits and virtues of the various uses of the notion of human security in Africa. We will omit these two aspects since one of them has already been addressed in a previous paper,[31] and the other, human security and its relationship to the involution of development indicators, is too lengthy to cover here. We will limit it to two examples:

a) "Securitization" and militarization of development: the omnipresence of security sector reform and the emergence of initiatives such as Africom

In recent years and in the context of "consolidation of peace" (peacebuilding in the restricted sense of United Nations), of political crisis outcomes and agreements to end armed violence, one of the constants has been the commitment to reform the security sector. In fact, this is not new, since it has been included in the agenda of development agencies —thanks to the impact of the Balkans conflict— since the mid-90s, first in Central America and the Balkans, and later in Africa. One of the most important elements in recent developments is the growing role of intergovernmental organizations in this issue. For example, a recent study by David Law (DCAF, 2007) showed the role of intergovernmental organizations, with particular emphasis on EU, OSCE, NATO, ECOWAS, Council of Europe, OECD, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In addition, Barnett and other scholars (2007) have shown how the British Government has tended in recent years to focus particularly on the security and military sector, while the U.S. is particularly interested in the democratization and economic recovery, although the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have led the U.S. to pay more attention to stabilization aspects. This suggests that donors have placed safety as a priority, a fact which means sacrificing resources towards other more important components in a post-war context.

In this context, the debate on the new conceptualization of threats has also reappeared, and specifically, the initiative of creating a "think tank" of social scientists in support of the new military operational command of the United States for Africa, AFRICOM, created by the Bush administration to prevent the blurring between the European Command, the Central Command and the Pacific Command of the decisions on the African continent. Specifically, the

headquarters of AFRICOM in Stuttgart launched a funding and recruiting proposal to create a unit of social scientists (with a PhD) to support this new command:

> "to help the command better understand Africa and its people, by creating, deploying, and managing social science research teams of varying duration and scope" (Varhola, 2010)

The least worrisome is the idea itself, on the other hand, not a novelty: it is reminiscent of the Camelot project, where the U.S. Armed Forces, in the 60s, would fund the social sciences regarding the case of Latin America. The project gave rise to a huge debate after Johan Galtung denunciated it publicly, although in that case there was no public and transparent announcement. What is relevant and pertinent, as noted by Edward Newman (2009), is that it shows a new strategy and a "focusing" on Africa in the U.S. thinking in the context of securitization after September 11. There have been assertions that this interest is related to the interest for the natural resources, to the "the war on terror" or simply to an attempt to counter China's growing role on the continent. Those analysis looking for the reasons of this interest in a "postwefalian" security thinking, which looks for the threats not in the struggle for hegemony between powerful powers (the aggression can only come from powerful states) but in 'failed' or weak states, "states prone to violence" or even in non-state actors, as posed, at the time, by Francis Fukuyama (2004) and Roland Paris, (2004) seem to us far more suggesting.[32] It seems to be a construct of the threat, which, however, has its roots in the fact that many indicators, indices, and governance or sates fragility observatories suggest that Africa is the region which includes the highest number of weak or potentially weak states in the future.[33] They usually point to a score of states, including, among others, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Angola, Kenya, Niger and Uganda. Back to Edwards, the harsh criticism and debate among the Africanists community generated by the proposal and the scarce interest in joining it show that the real risk is in the role, through securitization, implied by the proposal to build and consolidate a narrow view which would require exceptional measures —based on new threats— in the context of the instruments of peacebuilding and violent conflict prevention. The relationship between security, development and governance, in terms of construction of threats via securitization, is what gives meaning to what is only a reorganization of military structures: the proposal to create a unit of social scientists to back up and support the information for AFRICOM's decision taking shows that the alarmist agenda of securitizing the issue of governance and fragile states, driven by some hegemonic states, has made some headway.

It must not be forgotten that, following the Copenhagen School who created the concept of securitization, the risk of an issue getting securitized lies precisely in the fact that the policies advocated are not common, democratic and accountable, but rather, they are exceptional and emergency policies, with few or no controls in their wording and implementation, and mobilizing special financial and human resources.

b) New challenges to continental security: the case of drug trafficking in West Africa

An example of a very different character is the strong appearance in the security agenda, even in the mass media, of the role of drug-trafficking in West Africa —via Latin-American illegal groups and operators— and its impact on the whole of the continent. The media echoed the problem after the United Nations disclosed, in November 2, 2008, the crash in northern Mali of a Boeing registered in Venezuela. Apparently, the plane was carrying 10 tons of cocaine. A few months earlier, it was also discovered that agents of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had arrested three activists of Mali, members of Al Qaeda, and had them transferred to New York on charges of drug trafficking. Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau have also been at the origin of similar reports accounting for the dynamics affecting the region.

It must not be forgotten that most of the world's cocaine comes from three countries (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) and that, traditionally, the flows of transnational trafficking have used the Central America-US route and the Atlantic to Europe (either via South America or via the Caribbean) route. The West African connection and route is relatively new and seems to be in contradiction with the apparent laws of the market. That route means a significant increase in the travelling distance and shows the need to generate new networks and practices, which also means significant investments and initial transaction costs. Its profitability is related to the growing difficulties stemming from the controls in the traditional and more usual transit routes.

It seems that, at the beginning, the drug-trafficking networks worked with some Lusophone states such as Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde and that presently the phenomenon is already having an effect o —directly or indirectly— on all West African countries. There is even talk already of a "Coke Coast", and recent years have registered an increase of the number of seizures. Additionally, it has already been detected that the arrival of the organized crime methods linked to radical Islamist organizations using terrorist methods is having a noticeable impact on the social, economic and political life. Specifically, the destabilizing impact of the illegal trafficking across the Sahel, where the trading products have been extended to arms, cigarettes and other contraband, illegal migrants, hashish and cocaine, has also already been detected. United Nations, through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime issues (UNODC), has warned about the potential destabilizing effects

in a region where ongoing riots (Tuaregs in Mali and Niger), internal armed conflicts (Chad, Darfur) and the presence of Islamist terrorism (Al Qaeda, North Africa) coexist. There has even been said that West Africa could be not only a transit area, but, according to some evidence of substances found in Guinea, also a production area.[34]

The end result: there is talk of a triple threat: the links and / or the impact of organized crime, the drug traffic and the terrorism. The responses have gradually evolved. At first there was talk of simply "transit" while minimizing its impact, *i.e.*, omitting the destabilizing potential for civil society and the state of the emergence and the massive presence of transnational organized crime.[35] Subsequently, the magnitude of the challenge has been acknowledged and in countries such as the U.S., there have been suggestions advocating specific policies and proposals to combine economic development policies with a comprehensive security strategy for the sub region led by ECOWAS and with the support of UNODC and other countries. The latest development has been the Ministerial Conference in Dakar, on February 15, 2010, for the harmonization of the fight against illicit drug trafficking, with the support of United Nations, France and Spain. The issue occupies a prominent place on the agenda of ECOWAS, which has already adopted an Action Plan —pending of funding from the European Union— combining officials and law enforcement training, information sharing, harmonization of legal frameworks, better coordination and an increase on the allocated financial resources. Several institutions have already undertaken some initial studies on the impact of the criminal networks in the states of this region, particularly in Ghana (Anning, 2007).

The risk or the reasons for worrying are different, as well as the impact on the subregion and indirectly on the continent. Firstly, in particular, the securitization of the issue, which has a clear impact on the donors and on the regional development and security agenda. Secondly, the risk of the recurrence of perverse situations —stemming from the patronage relationship between the state, the organized crime and the security agencies— something very common in countries like Colombia. That is, the risk of the creation of "evil states", to use Jenny Pearce's terminology, situations where the state acts "to reproduce and transmit violences through socialization spaces rather than legitimately monopolize violence or create the conditions for society to live without violence" (Pearce, 2010: 301). Finally, the United Nations fears that the impact of this situation could reverse the remarkable gains achieved in recent years in countries like Sierra Leone in peacebuilding and encourage a new cycle of violence and destabilization.[36] With things as they are, in parallel with the significant and positive changes that the continent has witnessed in recent years, the new social and international context and the changing dynamics certainly raise some new questions and uncertainties that need to be gauged and assessed based on their impact in the medium and long term.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS

The reflections and some of the conclusions raised by this depiction —we insist, essentially descriptive— are relevant to the debate on the present and future of peace and security in Africa. First, the evolution in the recent years, particularly in the last decade, suggests a positive trend of fewer major armed conflicts. However, some scenarios such as Darfur, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia are serious security challenges for the continent. Moreover, a significant number of countries are still subject to military coups and political instability, in some cases, closely related to electoral processes. How could these armed conflict and political tension scenarios evolve? What role should the different African and international agencies, and the various African political and social actors play?

Second, it would appear that the holding of elections in most African contexts over the past two decades has not been accompanied by an improvement in governance indicators. Nevertheless, it is necessary to assess the usefulness of these indicators and to analyze the evolution of democratic processes in a broader sense and in context. What are the elements characterizing the political and democratic processes taking place today in Africa? What kind of indicators would be useful to assess and measure these processes?

Third, the last decade has indeed seen a greater involvement of the AU and regional organizations in the management of armed conflicts or situations of tension and political crisis. This growing process of operationalization of conflict and crisis management, however, has been accompanied by significant challenges at the political and logistical scale, creating major obstacles when intervening in contexts such as Darfur. What are the main shortcomings and achievements in this regard? What aspects should be taken into account in the consolidation of these mechanisms?

Fourth, the participation of civil society organizations, whose practice is more rooted in local worldviews, in peace processes, conflict resolution or peace-building, seems to be still underestimated and lacking enough analysis. What are the factors which have relegated civil society organizations or community-type and local initiatives to a secondary role? How can the APSA include these initiatives in its agenda?

Fifth, the EU and other international organizations such as United Nations have strengthened their cooperation with APSA in this type of contexts, although they are also subject to operational problems and difficulties. What is the balance of the EU's role in the

process of targeting peace and security architecture in Africa? What aspects should be assessed, in that regard, in the medium and long term?

Sixth and last, the conflict, peace and security reality in the African continent has experienced important changes in the last decade. These changes suggest the confirmation of the improvement in some aspects and, therefore, question the prevailing Afro-pessimistic analysis of the 80s and 90s, showing as well the emergence of new threats and challenges that draw a changing and complex future scenario. What is the most objective balance in peace and security in Africa in the current context of celebration of the 50th anniversary of the independences? How should the new social and international dynamics, the new security challenges and the possible scenarios in the medium and long term be assessed? What role could Peace research play in this analysis?

NOTES

1. Refers to armed conflicts that generate over a thousand deaths a year in the field of battle.

2. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict. Nevertheless, other indicators recorded other armed conflicts that SIPRI does not, as now the Ivory Coast.

3. Data was provided by the International Rescue Committee (http://www.theirc.org/special-reports/special-report-congo-y), although some research has questioned these figures and the methodology for calculating (http://guerrasconflictosarmados.suite101.net/article.cfm/reducen_los_fallecidos_en_rd_congo_a_la_mitad).

4. Organizations such as *Campaign for Good Governance*, *Network Movement for Justice and Development* or *Human Rights Committee*, among many others, took part in Abidjan (1996) and Lome (1999) processes.

5. See, among other reports: TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) 2004: *Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone TRC*, Sierra Leone.

6. See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC).

7. For more information, see, among others: LINDBERG, S. I. 2006: *Democracy and Elections in Africa*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press; BASEDAU, M., G. ERDMANN and A. MEHLER, 2007: *Votes, Money and Violence. Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

8. See *Transparency International*, in:http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table

9. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*, in: http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx

10. MO IBRAHIM FUNDATION, 2008: *The Ibrahim Index of African Governance*, in: http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index-2008/

11. Most of these indices use a set of variables to measure each different area, as follows: politics (Government effectiveness, rule of law, transparency and accountability, corruption control, types of freedom, etc.); security (political stability, recurrence of conflicts, incidence of coups d'état or human rights violations); economics (GDP per capita, inequality index, inflation, etc.); and socio-economic factors (infant mortality rate, literacy, malnutrition or access to drinking water).

12. Although Mauritania (the last to join in January 2008) has been suspended as a result of last year's coup d'état.

13. AU MONITOR, 2008: "Peer Review Progress, but Many Miss the Meeting", in: http://www.pambazuka.org/aumonitor/comments/peer_review_progress_but_many_miss_the_meeting/

14. AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE, in: http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/text/Charter%20on%20Democracy.pdf

15. AU MONITOR, 2009: "Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance", in: http://www.pambazuka.org/aumonitor/comments/2159/

16. See website: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/The_Peace_%20and_Security_Council_en.htm

17. The African Peace Facility, in: http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/africa/african_peace/index_en.htm

18. The UN coordinates 8 of the missions (BINUB in Burundi; UNIPSIL in Sierra Leona; MINURCAT in Chad and Central African Republic; MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo; UNOCI in Ivory Coast; UNMIL in Liberia; UNMIS in the south of Sudan; or MINURSO in Western Sahara), while France continues to manage its operation in Ivory Coast ("Operatión Licorne").

19. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, *The Responsability to Protect:* http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521&l=4

20. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, *The Responsibility to Protect*, en: http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp

21. UNITED NATIONS, *A More Secure World*, in: http://www.un.org/secureworld/

22. UNITED NATIONS, *In Larger Freedom*, in: http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/

23. UNITED NATIONS, "Secretary-general appoints Edward C. Luck of United States Special Adviser", in: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sga1120.doc.htm

24. UNITED NATIONS, Implementing *the Responsibility to Protect,* in*:* http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/featured_reports/2105

25. Constitutive Act of the African Union, in: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm

26. EIA Interview: Alex J. Bellamy on the Responsibility to Protect, in: http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/0123.html

27. See more information *The Joint Strategy*, in: http://europafrica.org/jointstrategy/

28. *The Joint Strategy (I. Peace and Security)*, in: http://europafrica.org/jointstrategy/1_peace-and-security/.

29. Íbidem.

30. See, for example: VAN CREVELD, M. 1991: *The Transformation of War*, Free Press, New York or IGNATIEF, M. 1997: "The Gods of War", *New York Review of Books*, 9 Octubre 1997

31. See MATEOS, O. 2010 (paper presented for this seminar)

32. See MATEOS, O. 2010. (paper presented for this seminar)

33. See first part of this paper.

34. See some news with regard to this issue: "World Drug Report 2010: drug use is shifting towards new drugs and new markets" in http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/June/drug-use-is-shifting-towards-new-drugs-and-new-markets.html; or "How a tiny West African country became the world's first narco state", in http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/09/drugstrade

35. See, for example: MAZZITELLI, A. 2007: "Transnational organizad crime in West Africa. The additional challenge", en *Internacional Affaire*, vol. 83, no 6, 2007, pp. 1071-1090.

36. See, for example: "Drug trafficking and violence threaten gains in West Africa – UN oficial" in http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31388&Cr=west+africa&Cr1=

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