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CONTINUA |
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Before so doing there is another
issue to be confronted. Much of the above work tends to proceed with only a background
reference to technological developments. We find technologists developing the architecture
associated with new learning environments while educators are aware of the need for new
pedagogies to exploit these architectures. We find a certain degree of awareness of what
the technology can do among Geographers and Economists, but it is limited. What is missing
is the ability to design new technology-based environments beginning from the
philosophical and epistemological assumptions associated with the Knowledge Economy. In
enabling things to happen, the technology development assumes certain things about how
these things do happen, without understanding how technology itself is based on certain
assumptions, while also being determinative in the sense that it makes things happen in
specific ways.
There are other consequences associated with the advent of the New Economy. There
is a shift away from neo-Classical principles of orthodox Economics. The new perspective
results in the claim that fluid labour markets are not conditioned merely by occupational
or sectorial knowledges, but by a capability for permanent learning. Thus, knowledge
comes to replace the role played by natural resources in the OE, and enterprise support
must be knowledge based (Williams, 2000).
Much of what is claimed by reference to the generation and management of
knowledge is encompassed in Wengers notion of communities of practice (Wenger,
1998). His work is remarkably eclectic and it is difficult to see how his mixing of
problematics does not result in epistemological contradiction. He embraces the work of
orthodox Marxists such as Gramsci, Bourdieu and Braverman side by side with the
asociological work of the ethnomethodologists. He incorporates the more conservative
thrust of Giddens work while also flirting with post structuralists and allied
thinkers including Bakhtin, Heideggar and Wittgenstein. He embraces the work of Michel
Foucault but is not comfortable with it because of its denial of the individual subject.
He does accept how Foucaults work involves
pervasive forms of discipline
sustained by discourses which define knowledge and truth
, and views discourse
as
a characterisation of practice
while not equating the two. He
is also critical of Foucault for ignoring identity, seemingly being unaware of how the
relationship between the individual, the subject and identity are handled in post
structural discourse analysis. This position is a consequence of his reliance on
Giddens (1984) notion of structuration, and Bourdieus (1980) emphasis on
social practice, theoretical conceptions which are open to criticism.
What does emerge is the claim that much of our knowledge is tacit in nature. This
is by no means a new idea and, in this case at least, appears to derive from the work of
Polyani (Polyani, 1983). It is another manifestation of the claim of both Giddens and
Bhaskar that the normative order of any society involves tacit knowledge. That is,
normativity is not seen as a preordained form which relates to social order, but is to be
found in the common sense of the ordinary citizen who is unable to easily express the
basis of this common sense. While Polyanis work is of relevance here, so also is the
more general work of post structuralism and how it has had a profound impact upon how
Sociologists have come to understand behaviour
What Wenger does with this awareness of the nature of knowledge is to relate it
to social practice. He claims that bounded communities operate social practice on the
basis of tacit knowledge. Within this process meaning is constantly negotiated, not as a
rational process, but as an on-going process of interaction which draws on tacit knowledge
in developing new knowledge. This would appear to be merely another manifestation of how
Sociology has always viewed social structure as patterned behaviour. What is
different is how he relates the production of knowledge, not to a rational form of
reflexivity, but rather, to the relationship between identity and the social construction
of meaning within social interaction among members of this community of practitioners. He
argues that the task for anyone interested in organisational learning is to be able to
uncover and exploit tacit knowledge.
Space does not permit a critical evaluation of Wengers work, nor that of
those who draw upon it. Rather, in the remainder of this paper I would like to attempt
what Wenger does not do to develop a framework based on language and its use which
embraces the idea of the social construction of meaning and how it relates to the
production of knowledge. In pursuing this objective I will not draw upon orthodox
linguistics which is based on Cartesian principles, but rather on what is known as French
Discourse Analysis (FDA) which is based upon post structuralism (Williams, 1999). I
retain the notion of a community of practice and seek to relate what is said about the
relationship between the construction of meaning and practice by reference to the new
workflows associated with multimedia content production.
4. Post structuralism (3)
The main focus I want to take by reference to post structuralism involves the
work of Foucault (1969). It can be claimed that his work focused on normativity, and
involved how the actions of norms in the life of humankind determine the kind of society
in which they themselves appear as subjects. It involves a novel definition of subjects
and objects and the relationships of these definitions to the constitution of meaning.
Normativity is not seen as a preordained form which relates to social order,
but rather, as the effects of discourse which establishes a norm of knowledge which is
expressed as truth. In this respect it differs from orthodox Sociological meta
discourse which constructs the normative order as a manifestation of the social order
which the individual rationally engages with. Thus Foucault shares in common with more
recent understanding of normativity as pertaining to forms of tacit knowledge which
relates to the individual, but which that individual is unable to express.
Foucault referred to the norm in two ways. Firstly by reference to how it engages
objects as in its juridical sense, and secondly how it involves the
norms subjects. The norm sets boundaries which are related to
judgement about the merits of inclusion and exclusion and results in domination. When we
treat norm as discourse which not only sets boundaries in constructing subjects and
objects in relation to each other, while institutionalising or stabilising certain
discourses as normative, we begin to see how domination operates and how liberation is
achieved.
The individual does not exist outside of discourse but, as we shall see in a
moment, is brought into existence through her engagement with discourse within which she
becomes the subject of that discourse. This means that the individual is not the centred
rational subject of Cartesianism, fully capable of making rational decisions about social
practice and her role in it. This also has implications for the concept of ideology in
that Post structuralism argues that ideology is not constituted outside of practice, but
only emerges within social practice. Ideology is not constituted before the act.
However there is also a need to relate the individual as subject with the social,
either as subject or as object. This is achieved by recognising that the norm is that
whereby, and across which, society communicates with itself. The norm is the link, the
principle of unity and communication of individualities. It is also a relationship between
the local and the global. The stabilisation of discourse involves relatively fixed
relations between subjects and objects, and it is this stabilisation which gives the norm
its enduring quality. Change occurs when discourses are destabilised. What Foucault
achieves is to recognise the norm as a principle of communication devoid of origin and
devoid of a subject. Normative individualisation occurs without reference to a nature, nor
to an essence of subjects. We conform without realising how and why we conform. It is an
account that is not far removed from the notion of tacit knowledge. Normativity becomes
the effects of discourse which establishes a norm of knowledge expressed as
truth. If society is viewed as the pattern of recurring human
behaviour, then the focus on discourse collapses the distinction between language and
society which has been at the heart of Sociology for two centuries. Viewing language acts
as social acts is to consider its stability within a ruled system of social relastionships
that involves shared meaning across locuteurs.
The essence of Foucaltian DA is that meaning is conditioned by what he refers to
as discursive formations. Indeed, a discursive formation is circumscribed by how it
pertains to meaning. It relates to stabilised discourse within which meaning is fixed, as
are subjects and objects. Thus, in some respects it resembles the notion of communities of
practice except that the focus is upon discourse as practice, and meaning as associated
with practice, rather than focusing upon the actors within the community. A
discursive formation sets limits on what can be said while determining what must be said
from a given subject position. It is in this sense that it determines meaning.
5. French Discourse Analysis (FDA)
FDA is the analytic component of post-structuralism. Evidently it is
obliged to resort to a form of linguistics, or more centrally, a semantics which is
not premised on the centred, rational subject. In this respect it departs from
Chomskys position within which semantics belongs entirely to the linguistic field,
where semantics is a natural extension of the syntactic, so that meaning is a fact of
language. For Chomsky, the individual rationally chooses from among a range of possible
meanings which derive from the essentially ambiguous nature of language. The
alternative to this Cartesianism is what is known as enonciative linguistics (Culioli,
1990) which I will return to in the next section.
There is a sense in which normativity is conceived of as shared meaning, not
merely between individuals, but also across individuals. This being the case, if there is
a means whereby shared meaning can be ascertained outside of the orthodoxy of a Sociology
based upon rationalism, then that is all that is required. Discourse comes to be
equated with society. Social places are defined in discursive materiality, through the
effects of discourse, rather than in an analytic meta discourse of a Sociology external to
discourse. Social places are opened up in the materiality of discourse. This observation
underlines that Sociology is merely an account which suffices to indicate the form of
social practice. It is an account that is premised upon the centrality of reason, and the
insistence of sociological orthodoxies such as there is one society for each
state. The focus shifts from this concern to how the effects of meaning organise and
permit the understanding of the dimension of the physical inscription of social processes.
This involved two things how enonciation relates to social places, and how the
inter-discursive accumulation conditions the memory of notions and their function. I will
consider each of these in turn.
A discussion of the relationship between enonciation and social places leads to a
discussion of how the individual is transformed into the subject of discourse. Of central
importance is the concept of interpolation, where the individual is interpolated as the
subject of discourse. Any language act involves an inter-discursivity of constructed
or preconstructed places which the individual can or cannot be interpolated into. The
subject as a human being is not the same as the linguistic subject. The I of
grammar is not the same as the speaking subject.
It is in discursive materiality that social places are defined. Social practice
becomes the effects of discourse, in its materiality. Discursive structure replaces the
normative context of orthodox Sociology in which the individual is socialised in relation
to pre-established norms and value systems. The discursive materiality imposes itself on
the locuteur in organisaing the effects of position and disposition.
Institutions involve stable structures of types of acts and the places with which
they are associated. That is, they lie at the heart of discursive stability. The
individual can only be drawn into these places through signification, and the
interpolation of actor-speakers into the categorised places is a performative act. The
subject places which open up within discourse are there to be taken up or rejected by the
individual through signification and interpolation. If the individual takes in charge of a
place, she becomes the subject of that discourse. Furthermore, each subject relates to
other subjects and to objects within that discourse. She accepts the social places which
are constructively marked. Within discursive interaction any statement only has virtual
meaning, but this virtuality is presupposed and taken in charge by all of the participants
in the process in a non-marked way. Not taking in charge is viewed as an explicit process
of refusal. The explicit process (marked) can be actualised in the form of language acts
(enonciation), or non-language acts (non cooperation in the act).
Institutionalisation which involves tacit knowledge is treated in terms of the
relationship between the places that relate to the structuration of action, and how
individuals are interpolated into these places.
Turning to interdiscursive accumulation, this involves the role of the past in
conditioning the present. Current discourse accommodates and incorprorates prior
discourse. The meaning of any notion such as Wales cannot be elaborated
outside of how it has been historically constructed as an object. Similarly, all
discourses encompass traces of the past in the way in which stabilised discourse fixes the
meaning of subjects and objects, and the relationship between them. Thus when we confront
such a discourse we are also confronting the archaeology of the past and how it conditions
current meanings.
Meaning has already been discussed by reference to how each discursive formation
frames specific meaning. Subject places are partly pre-defined by prior discourse,
and the enonciateur occupies a specific place in relation to other subjects and objects
which provide the structure we know as the discursive formation. Such places
determine what can and must be said by the enonciateur. By reference to the social,
a discursive formation is conceived of as the structuring of social space by the
differentiation of discourse. Discursive formations diferentiate discourse, and
thereby structure localities on the basis of regularities. These regularities are
akin to legitimisation, involving unmarked discourse. From the point of view of
signification there can be no difference between the language act and its
enonciateur; legitimacy is presupposed. Whether or not the locuteur takes the
discourse in charge, the place of enonciateur is external to signification, and is a
matter of meaning.
A fact is social only when it is put in meaning, directly or
indirectly, in the speech act. An act becomes a social act through social
signification, linked to its stability in the ruled system of social relations. The social
is defined by a certain type of stability, involving the shared meaning between the
locuteur and others, a meaning which is manifested in analagous acts. Social
actors relate to the institutionalisation of behaviour or social practice and, in
this respect, conform with the non-marked nature of the subject in discourse. A language
act creates institutional places replete with subject places into which the individual is
interpolated, taking in charge the discourse in relation to the place that the discourse
assigns them. The subject lies at the intersection of form and meaning.
It is also important that this perspective is social rather than merely being
relevant to the individual. The concept of interpolation is social rather than
psychological. The places into which the individual is interpolated are not merely
individual places, but also pertain to social groups. Thus, a discourse on social
differentiation may well open up places that pertain to gender, social class or language
groups.
Identity is no longer the rational process whereby the individual rationally
expresses her sense of self. Rather, it pertains to how the individual is transformed into
the subject of discourse, and what is revealed about the individual as the discourse
unwinds, and the relationships between the subject and other subjects and between the
subject and objects are revealed. This means that identity cannot be a mater of
self-reference but must encompass the others as social. |
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