Pragmatics and discourse analysis

by Margarida Bassols Puig

Abstract

Pragmatics, like discourse analysis, goes beyond structural study of the phrase and focuses on higher units -speech acts and conversation turns: What is more, it focuses on its object of study through consideration of the context and its construction, through recognition of speaker intention, and through the establishment of implicit elements which the hearer has to access. In this article, we apply the concept of *discourse orientation* to certain statements of argumentation made by leading candidates in the November 2003 elections to the Catalan legislature.

Summary

1. Introduction
2. The contribution made by pragmatics
3. Pragmatics and argumentative discourse
4. Conclusion
5. Bibliography

1. Introduction

Around the beginning of the seventies, impelled by the leap forward that the "théorie de l'énonciation" had taken with the differentiation of sentences from propositions, and propositions from utterances, a group of theories and theorists sought to go beyond the limits of the sentence, and to engage with the meaning of discourse, that is non-arbitrary sequences of utterances.

In fact, the initial idea was that besides the known linguistic units (phonemes, morphemes, sintactic constituents and lexical items) belonging to the different levels characterising a language, one could postulate another new unit of analysis, which went beyond phrase-level: namely discourse.

Discourse could be understood variously as a linguistic unit like the others mentioned above[1], or as a communicative level linked to the subject that produced it[2], or as the result of a human activity intimately related to social ideologies[3].

Soon, a universal principle emerged, generally speaking intuitive rather than anything that could be strictly formulated, known as the *Coherence principle,* according to which discourse is a coherent sequence of phrases and any discourse is interpreted based on the expectation that it will have a degree of coherence.

Furthermore, certain linguistic elements were postulated as markers of this coherence, working as indicators to give the text coherence. Considered in this respect were pronouns, definite descriptions and discursive anaphoric nominal syntagms; pragmatic connectors and tenses of the verb.

And in terms of structure, the macrostructure and microstructure of discourse were discussed, for example by Van Dijk, referring to the semantics and syntax which provided its vehicle. Also a series of linguistic markers were isolated, notably by the Geneva School, which worked together to construct this.

---

[1] An idea pursued in the 50s and 60s by Anglo-Saxon writers who were looking for a "grammar of discourse" and who studied phenomena such as cohesion, argumentation, narrativity and the structures of different text types.

[2] An idea pursued by French linguists, especially in the 80s and 90s. They followed in the footsteps of Benveniste and researched into modality, transparency and order of elements in an utterance.

[3] An idea pursued by Foucault, Fairclough and scholars of critical analysis of language. They focused on less privileged language learners in underdeveloped or developing societies, the processes by which reading is learned, the language use of immigrants, social presuppositions, prejudices and insincerity.

On the one there were hand markers of illocutionary function: the performative verbs, the markers of indirect language and syntactic inversion. On the other hand, there were the interactive function markers, including those that structure conversation and speech turns, and there were the connectors.

At all events, the most debated and most debatable issue was, and still is, the delimitation of the constituent units of discourse. For this the grammatical sentences might be chosen, or conversely the utterances, the latter being sentences in use. But, also, in the nineties, based on conversational analysis as carried out for instance by the Geneva School, it came to be argued that the constituent unit of discourse could perfectly well be the speech act --that is to say, the use of a complete grammatical phrase (Reboul & Moeschler 1998, 29). This idea was further supported by, for example, the work carried out by Ducrot.

2. The contribution made by pragmatics[4]

It is plain that discourse analysis has objectives that lie very close to, if not shared by, those of pragmatics. This is because discourse is none other than a sequence of sentences in operation -in other words utterances. But while discourse analysts explain the interpretation of the elements in question without going outside language, pragmatics resorts to other ambits of human activity (beliefs, feelings, knowledge, intentions...). Only in this way can one explain how utterances are interpreted and how successful interpretation of utterances is managed. It is only with the aid of considerations of a pragmatic nature that we can go beyond the question "What does this utterance mean?" and ask "Why was this utterance produced?".

1 Ms: Vagi una mica de pressa a convèncer el PSOE perquè tenim pressa tots plegats per fer tot això. (You should hurry up a little in persuading the PSOE, because we're all in a hurry to do all that[5].)

Mr: Vostè llegeix els diaris? (Do you read the papers?[6])

To know why Mr (Maragall) asks the question, we need to bear in mind quite a number of considerations of a pragmatic nature, for example, the degree of relevance of the question: in fact considerable, given that this is a political debate.

While discourse analysis can only explain that this is a reply to the observation made by Ms (Mas) or explain what type of sentences make up each of the utterances, pragmatics will explain what kind of reply it is, based on one or more implicatures. For example, "if you read the newspapers you will know that I have done so many times", or "as I am sure that you read the newspapers, I think you know perfectly well that I have done so, therefore your observation is unnecessary". Taking a pragmatic approach, the linguist can successfully uncover the intention that Mr has in selecting "Do you read the papers?", and why he selected this utterance rather than another one.

Pragmatics' object of study is "language use and language users" (Haberland & Mey 2002, 1673), and language use-understood as a universal human capacity and activity-necessitates recourse to non-linguistic elements to be properly interpreted, because it makes use of inference and needs interlocutors to have knowledge of the world. "The study of language use has to explain how it is that sentences produced are successfully interpreted by interlocutors" (Reboul & Moeschler 1998, 35).

What has pragmatics to offer that is new? What new elements are in play here? Basically it relies on the speaker's interpretative strategy, in which the latter attributes qualities and moods such as rationality, desires and mental states to other speakers. Such an

---

[4] Understood as a way of looking at linguistics, rather than a subdiscipline of linguistics.

[5] The reference here is to the Estatut d'Autonomia català (the Catalan Statute of Autonomy).

[6] The examples in this article are taken from a televised debate which took place between candidates to the presidency of Generalitat de Catalunya (Regional Autonomous government of Catalonia) in November 2003. The political spectrum was formed by (from right to left, politically speaking): Partit Popular (Josep Piqué), Convergència i Unió (Artur Mas), Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Pasqual Maragall), Esquerra Republicana (Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira), and Iniciativa per Catalunya / els Verds (Joan Saura). The abbreviations used are: Mr (Maragall), Ms (Mas) and C (Carod), since these are the three politicians we focus on.

interpretative strategy is orientated towards predicting other speakers' behavior, above all their interpretative behavior. Additionally, pragmatic theory has three central concepts: context, intention, and inference.

Needless to say, these are not concepts that have never been used by other approaches to language. In particular, context plays a relevant role in cultural anthropology, derived from Malinowski's idea of the "context of situation" (Malinowski 1949), in other words the general conditions under which a language is spoken. For Malinowski, situation and expression are inseparable. Discourse analysis retains this concept and indeed makes it one of its central pillars. On the other hand, the concepts of speaker intention and inferences play a fundamental role in Speech Act theory and in formulations of Grice's principle of Cooperation.

But every one of these terms has a different meaning in the different theoretical paradigms.

Let us take context, for instance: in Discourse Analysis this is something which is outside the speakers and is static in nature, framing the communicative activity, it constitutes the place and the time in which the latter takes place; in pragmatics, on the other hand, it is something personal and dynamic. For Sperber & Wilson (1980), for example, it is not a given at the outset, but rather is constructed by the interlocutors utterance by utterance. It includes the series of premises that have to do with knowledge of the world, and to a combination of perceptive data known by the interlocutors; it also involves a series of items of information extracted from the interpretation of preceding utterances at any given moment. The theory of knowledge and linguistics are interrelated here.

Turning to intention, pragmatics defends the idea that recognition of speaker intention conditions success in overall interpretation of an utterance. "Interlocutors arrive at a satisfactory interpretation of the utterance, if they succeed in recovering the contents that the speaker intended to communicate by means of that utterance" (Reboul & Moeschler 1998, 47).

For Searle, this intention is expressed by means of certain linguistic conventions, which are the central core, while intention is relegated to the anecdotal; for Grice, on the other hand, meaning and intention are never explicit and transparent, they can only be recovered thanks to the implicit elements.

The pragmatic theory of relevance put forward by Sperber & Wilson was a further advance, and separates the informative intention -which is that the speaker wishes to manifest a series of assumptions- from the communicative intention -which is that they also want to communicate their intention of so doing.

It is plain that to succeed in correctly interpreting these two intentions, the receiver of the message has to work with the implicit knowledge which Grice speaks of. What we have, then, is a third important concept, which includes all that is inferred by the interlocutors from what is said. In reality, it is knowledge shared by both, and which both know to be shared in this way.

3. Pragmatics and argumentative discourse

Among the different ways in which discursive activity may manifest itself, argumentation is one which has particularly attracted the interest of scholars, because it is omnipresent in communicative activity and because it dominates political, legal and advertising discourse modes.

Based on Speech Act theory (Searle 1970) we can state that the argument as an illocutionary act is associated with the perlocutionary act of *persuasion*, an act whose objective is to get interlocutors or audience to accept a series of ideas —the arguments- which involve the demonstration of a conclusion.

Van Eemeren (1984, 43-45) characterises the illocutionary act of *persuasion* in the following way. It has:

- *Propositional content*, the totality of propositions expressed.

- *An essential condition*, the fact of articulating this series of propositions constitutes an attempt by the speaker to justify an opinion O to the hearer.

- *Preparatory conditions*, the speaker believes *a)* that the hearer will not accept opinion O at the outset, *b)* that the hearer will accept the totality of propositions expressed, *c)* that the hearer will accept the constellation of propositions as a justification of O.

- *Sincerity conditions*, the speaker believes that *a)* O is acceptable, *b)* the propositions expressed in the utterances are acceptable, *c)* that these propositions constitute a reasonable justification of O.

To put it another way: speakers, who know they have an opinion O which is not accepted at the outset by the interlocutors, employ a series of propositions which are thought to be acceptable and which are thought to be a good justification of O, in order to change interlocutors' initial opinion.

When thinking of a strategy to convince or persuade the interlocutor, by means of the relationship between one or more arguments and a conclusion, definition of the discourse orientation has a very important place. The discourse orientation is the movement or direction we wish to give to the coherent totality of speech acts and which we wish to induce in our receptor. While we construct the discourse we impose on it a precise process of interpretation, offering guidance on how to attribute meaning to our utterance. In this way we guide listeners along the interpretative path which will lead them to understand what we say and the intention with which we say it. And we do so by devising a strategy, applying effort to the selection of words and discourse movement, with a view to achieving certain specific communicative objectives. If we apply this concept to argumentative discourse, we can tease out three basic argumentative orientations: the concessive, the consecutive and the conclusive.

a) Concessive orientation, which operates with two speech acts or two interventions[7] One which argues in favor of an implicit conclusion *r*, and another which does so in favor of a conclusion *-r* and which, accordingly, questions precisely the relevance of the first act. When weighing up the force of the two acts the result implies *-r.*

Even though you come you won't see him
       1   2
You will come > you will see him (implicit conclusion *r*)
You won't see him (*-r*)

2 makes it clear that the first act is not relevant, argumentatively speaking, because its implicit conclusion is not acceptable. Put another way, "there is no use in your coming if what you want is to see him"[8].

In the corpus we analysed we found these examples of concessive argumentation in the speech acts:

(2) C- És cert que hem pujat més que la mitjana europea, *però* hem pujat menys que la mitjana espanyola. (It's true that we have risen more than the European average (implicit conclusion*: we have risen more than the Spanish average*) *but* we have risen less than the Spanish average.)

(3) Mr- 23 anys de govern donen per molt, *però* els darrers anys no han donat de si. (23 years in government yield a great deal [of experience, etc]) (implicit conclusion*: the last few years have yielded a great deal*) but the last few years have not yielded a great deal.)

(4) C- No s'ha aconseguit el millor finançament, *en canvi* sí que hem aconseguit

---

[7] By turn or intervention we mean, according to conversational analysis, the maximum monological chunk -a single turn in a conversation. Each turn or intervention will include one or more speech acts.

[8] The connectors associated with this movement are: *encara que* (although, even though), *però* (however, but), *per bé que* (while; even given that), *malgrat que* (despite (the fact that)), *per molt que* (however much).

ofensives directes. (We didn't secure the best financing (implicit conclusion. *we didn't achieve anything*), but *on the other hand* we did achieve the best direct offensives.)

(5) Ms- Tenia tot el dret de dir-me que no volia pactar amb mi, *però* en el fons li interessava que haguéssim de pactar amb el PP. (You was quite within your rights to tell me you didn't want to form a political alliance with me (implicit conclusion*: You didn't think it was possible to form an alliance with me*), *but* in the final analysis it suited you for us to have to form an alliance with the PP (Partit Popular).)

(6) C- Nosaltes no podem assumir la responsabilitat de totes les coses que havia fet vostè, *no* només de les bones, sinó de les dolentes. (We can't take responsibility for all the things you've done (implicit conclusion*: it was easy to do so because they were all good*), *not* just the good things, *but* also the bad things.)

(7) Ms- No sempre l'entenc *però* vaja procuro estar informat. (I don't always understand you (implicit conclusion*: I'm not informed about what you are saying*) *but* I certainly do seek to keep informed.)

(8) C- La volem més plena, *però* de moment és compartida. (We want it to be fuller [sovereignty for Catalonia] (implicit.conclusion*: sovereignty can be full*) *but* at the moment it is shared.)

(9) Ms- Ja li he dit que tenia tot el dret, Ø simplement subratllo que va dir que no. (I already said that you were within your rights (implicit conclusion*: even though you were within your rights you shouldn't have said no*), I'm *simply*[9] underlying the fact that you said no.)

(10) C- No ho diu vostè, Ø ho diu el senyor Duran Lleida, que va a la seva llista.
(It's not you who says that (implicit conclusion*: as you head the list of your party's candidates you lay down the guidelines for what your coalition says*) it's Mr Duran Lleida who's on your list who says that.)

And these occurred among the interventions:

(11) Ms- vostès no van complir les resolucions que obligaven a fer públiques les balances fiscals.
Mr- *Però* vostè està d'acord de que es faci ara?
(Ms- You [i.e.your party] did not comply with the resolutions that made it obligatory to publish tax entries (implicit conclusion*: you maintain your position as in the past with respect to tax entries*).
Mr- *But* you agree to having that done now?)

(12) Ms- La volem més plena, però de moment és compartida.
Mr- Aquesta discusió sobre la sobirania *no* és el que interessa més a la gent, per descomptat.
(Ms- We want it to be fuller [sovereignty for Catalonia] (implicit. conclusion: *the issue of sovereignty is of great interest to people*).
Mr- This discussion on sovereignty *isn't* what most interests people, obviously.)

b) Consecutive orientation, which also contains only two speech acts or interventions. One is an argument in favour of *r* and the other is precisely the argumentative conclusion *r.* Thus the conclusion motivates the argument simplicity by being expressed.

<u>You don't want to come</u>, <u>so don't come</u>.
     1   2

1 serves as the argument for 2. "As you don't want to come, don't do so". In the corpus we found the following examples of consecutive orientation:

(13) Mr- Ho he dit als citutadans, *perquè* ells ho veuen.
(I said so to the citizens (conclusion), *because* they can see it (argument).)

---

[9] This symbol indicates that the connector *però* (however, but) is elided or omitted, and only the modifier is present, or, as in the next example, not even the modifier.

(14) Mr- *Si* crees un enemic i no el vences, doncs aleshores la situació és la pitjor de totes.
(*If* you create an enemy and you don't defeat it (argument), then the situation is the worst of all (conclusion).)

(15) C- Hem estat un partit responsable, amb una actitud positiva i constructiva, *per això* ens vam abstenir en el debat d'investidura de Jordi Pujol, en gest de responsabilitat.
(We have been a responsible party, with a positive and constructive attitude (argument), *for that reason* we abstained from the debate on Jordi Pujol's investiture, as a gesture of responsibility (conclusion).)

(16) Mr- *Si* hi hagués la possibilitat que quedés bloquejat el canvi, Catalunya
estaria davant d'un problema.
(*If* the process of change could possibly have become blocked (argument), Catalonia would have been faced with a serious problem (conclusion).)

(17) Ms- Li recordo amb el to més amical possible, *perquè* no em vull barallar amb vostè, ni molt menys.
(I remind you in the most amicable tone possible (conclusion), *because* I don't want a fight with you, far from it (argument).)

(18) Ms- A vostè li interessa que haguéssim de tenir acords amb el Partit Popular *perquè* vostè tenia l'expectiva de guanyar uns quants vots.
(You would benefit from us having to form an alliance with the Partido Popular (conclusion) *because* you stand to gain a few votes (argument).)

(19) Mr- *Si* vostès no aproven l'Estatut, també l'aprovarem.
(*If* you [i.e. your party] don't pass the *Estatut* [(Statute of Catalan Autonomy], then we shall pass it too.)

(20) Mr- Acabi, acabi, *perquè* no està dient res de nou.
(Get on with it, get on with it (conclusion), *because* you're not saying anything new (argument).)

(21) Ms- Crec que podem fer coses junts i, *per tant*, jo protegiré la relació que tenim
(I think we can do things together (argument), and *for that reason* I'll protect the relationship that we have (conclusion).)

(22) C- Estigui tranquil, *que* el senyor Mas ja li acaba de dir que el seu Estatut no està per la sobirania.
(Relax (conclusion), Mr Mas has just told you that his Statute isn't to do with sovereignty (argument).)

c) *Conclusive* orientation, which operates with three constituents, instead of two.

One in favour of the impliciticit conclusion *r,* another in favour of *-r* (minus *r*), and a third which acts as a conclusion, which is orientated towards *-r.*

The weather man said it would rain, but she didn't believe him.
                    1   2

As it turned out, she didn't get wet.
                    3

1 orientates us towards the implicitit conclusion "she will get wet", while 2 orientates us towards "she won't get wet". The third act, however, goes in the same direction as 2; in the end she doesn't get wet.[10]

Conclusive orientations are not the most usual in our corpus, perhaps because we are working with speech acts, in which context they are complex and difficult to interpret. Nonetheless we did find the following:

---

[10] The connectors in this movement are: *de totes maneres* (all the same, even so), *en el fons* (at bottom), *ras i curt* (in short), *en definitiva* (in short, in fact). But these too are often omitted.

(23) C- Nosaltres no podíem assumir la responsabiltat de totes les coses que havia fet vostè. No només de les bones sinó de les dolentes. Les dolentes se les queden vostès.
(We can't assume responsibility for all the things that you've done (conclusion*: we didn't want the good things*). Not just the good things, but the bad things (argument 2*: we didn't want the good things*). You (and your party) can keep the bad things (argument 1. *of the impliciticit conclusion: we keep the good ones*).)

(24) Ms- Tenia tot el dret a fer-ho (dir que no) però en el fons ja li interessava que haguéssim de mantenir acords amb el Partit Popular, perquè d'aquesta manera, probablement, vostè tenia l'expectativa, no pensant en el país sinó pensant en Esquerra, molt legítimament, de guanyar uns quans vots.
(You had every right to do so (say no) (argument 1 of the impliciticit conclusion*: for the good of the country*) but at bottom you would benefit from our having to form alliances with the Partido Popular (argument 2: *for the good of your party*) because that way, probably, you stood to gain a few votes, not thinking of the country but, quite rightly, thinking of Esquerra (party) (conclusion*: for the good of your party*).)

(25) Mr- És que, si vostès no l'aproven (l'Estatut) també l'aprovarem, i l'aprovarem per gran majoria.
(The fact is, if you don't pass it (Statute) (argument 1 of the impliciticit conclusion*: the statute won't be passed*) then we will (argument 2*: the statute will be passed*) and we'll do so by a big majority (conclusion*: the statute will be passed*).)

(26) Ms- No sempre l'entenc, perquè de tant en tant el dilluns diu una cosa, el dimarts en diu una altra, el dimecres una altra, el dijous una altra, però vaja jo procuro estar informat.
(I don't always understand you (conclusion*: it's difficult to follow you*) because from time to time on Monday you say one thing, on Tuesday another, on Wednesday another, on Thursday another (argument 1 of the implicit conclusion*: you often change your mind, it's difficult to follow you*), but I certainly do seek to keep informed (argument 2*: I manage to follow you*).)

(27) Mr- Això que vostè reclama, vostès no hi creuen quan governen. Miri, que era fàcil durant els anys que vostès van governar perquè tenien totes les resolucions aprovades en aquest sentit. Per què no ho van fer? Per la mateixa raó que el senyor Rato, perquè no volen conflictes entre les autonomies.
(What you are calling for, your party didn't believe in when you are in power (conclusion*: you don't believe in autonmous government*). Look how easy it would have been when you were in government because you had all the necessary motions passed (argument 1 of the implicit conclusion*: you could have shown that you believed in it*). Why didn't you do it? For the same reason as Mr. Rato, because you didn't want trouble with the other autonomous regional governments (argument 2*: you don't believe in it*).)

(28) Ms- Amb vostès ens va costar déu i ajuda treure el 15% de l'IRPF. ¿I ara vostè diu que no tenim el millor sistema de finançament, quan tenim el 33% de l'IRPF, el 35% de l'IVA, el 40% dels impostos especials i el 100% d'altres impostos?
Escolti, molt millor del que teniem quan negociàvem amb vostès. Per tant, home, una mica d'objectivitat en la informació.
(With your lot it we had to move Heaven and Earth to get that 15% of the income tax (argument 1 of the impliciticit conclusion*: in the past you didn't want the best financing system*) And now you say that we don't have the best financing system, when have (i.e. Catalonia receives) 33% of income tax, 35% of the VAT, 40% of special taxes and 100% of other taxes (argument 2*: now you've changed your mind*).
Look here, that's much better than what we had when we negociated with you. So, come on, [let's have] a bit of objectivity in your information (conclusion*: you (your party) change your mind*).)

In addition to keeping track of the argumentative orientations, it is also worthwhile noting that in all interventions constructed by speakers in a dialogue, argumentative interventions or otherwise, there can be several different speech acts, of which one will always be the directive (DA) while others are optional and act as subordinates (SA). Thus, "Do come, we'll have a good time" has two acts, of which "Do come" is the directive and "we'll have a good time" the subordinate. In the corpus we found these instances, with one directive and two subordinates.

(29) <u>Amb vostès ens va costar déu i ajuda treure el 15% de l'IRPF.</u>
                                AD
<u>És com si els hi haguéssim arrencat un queixal en aquell moment, quan</u>
<u>vostès governaven</u>, <u>no?</u>
AS1   AS2

(<u>With your lot it we had to move Heaven and Earth to get that 15% of the income tax.</u>
                                AD

<u>It was as if we'd pulled one of your teeth out, at that time, when you were in power,</u> <u>wasn't</u>
<u>it?</u>   AS1   AS2

(30) <u>Estigui tranquil</u>,
            AD
que <u>el senyor Mas ja li acaba de dir que el seu Estatut no està per la sobirania</u>,
AS1
<u>tots contents i tots pel camí de sempre.</u>
                    AS2

(<u>Relax,</u>
AD
<u>Mr Mas has just told you that his Statute isn't to do with sovereignty,</u>
AS1
<u>so everybody happy and on the same road as ever.)</u>
AS2

The subordinates strengthen the illocutionary force of the directive, they round it out and complement it. However, in the discourse generated in a political debate, as strange as it may seem, we find few instances, because the orator has little time to formulate, and this feature greatly increases the informational density of the intervention.

4. Conclusion

What we have presented here, then, is a rapid approximation to the complexity of discourse, plus a series of concepts, taken from pragmatic theory and the theory of argumentation which may make the analysis clearer. We have seen that the concessive orientation is the most habitual in the type of political debate analysed here, followed by the consecutive orientation. The conclusive mode, on the other hand, is not found so frequently, except in the chunks of monologue, the parts of the discourse which the speakers had partially prepared -occurring in the first few minutes and closing minutes of the debate. The pragmatic markers that work to indicate these orientations constitute a restricted list, and in any case may be omitted. Comparative analysis of the argumentative orientations in the speech of the different politicians analysed in this article, may make it considerably clearer to us, why they are more, or less, effective.

5. Bibliography

ANSCOMBRE, J. C. and DUCROT, O. *L'argumentation dans la langue*. Brussels: Madarga, 1983.

BASSOLS; M. *Les claus de la pragmàtica.* Vic: EUMO, 2001.

DUCROT, O. *Les echelles argumentatives*. Paris: Ed. Minuit, 1984.

GRICE, H. P. "Logic and conversation". A COLE, P. & MORGAN, J. (eds): *Syntax and Semantics. Vol. 3. Speech Acts.* Nova York: Academic Press, 1975. P. 41-58.

GRICE, H. P. "Further notes on logic and conversation". A COLE, P. (ed.): *Syntax and semantics, Vol. 9. Pragmatics.* Nova York: Academic Press, 1978. P.113-128.

HABERLAND, H. & MEY, J. L. "Linguistics and pragmatics, 25 years after". *Journal of Pragmatics.* [Amsterdam] (2002), vol. 34, n. 12, p.1671-1682.

MALINOWSKI, W. "El problema del significado en las lenguas primitivas". A OGDEN, C. K. i RICHARDS, I. A. *The meaning of meaning,* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949.

MOESCHLER, J. *Dire et contradire: pragmatique de la negation et acte de réfutation dans la conversation.* Franckfort: Peter Lang, 1982.

MOESCHLER, J. *Argumentation et conversation. Élements pour une analyse pragmatique du discours*. Paris: Hatier-Credif, 1985.

MOESCHLER, J. *Modelisation du dialogue: répresentation de l'inference argumentative*. Paris: Hermes, 1989.

MOESCHLER, J. (ed.) *Argumentation, relevance and discourse*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.

REBOUL, A. & MOESCHLER, J. *Pragmatique du discours.* Paris: Armand Colin, 1998.

SEARLE J. F. *Speech Acts. An essay in the philosophy of language.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Ed. Castellana, Cátedra, 1980.

SPERBER, D. & WILSON, D. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. 2a ed., 1995.

van EEMEREN, F. H. *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions.* Dordrecht: Foris Publication, 1984.

van EEMEREN, F. H. *Fundamentals of argumentation theory: a handbook of historical backgrounds*. Mahwah: Earlbaum, 1996.

van EEMEREN, F. H. *Crucial concepts in argumentation theory.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001.

van EEMEREN, F. H. i GROOTENDORST *Argumentation, communication and fallacies: a pragma-dialectal perspective*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Earlbaum, 1992.

Margarida Bassols i Puig
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
margarida.bassols@uab.es