THE INTERNATIONAL CATALAN INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN CATALONIA

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Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques (IGOP)
PROJECT DIAGNOSIS
FINAL REPORT

THE INTERNATIONAL CATALAN INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN CATALONIA

Relationship models

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Institut de Govern i Politiques Públiques (IGOP)
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1. INTRODUCTION

The passing of the Peace Promotion Act (21/2003) by the Catalan Parliament on 4 July 2003 signified an important step forward in the public institutions’ support for the Catalan peace movement. Act 21/2003 laid the foundations for the setting up of the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau and set the process in motion for the setting up of the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP).

The Strengthening of Peace Act signified the institutional recognition of the work undertaken by the peace movement in Catalonia, at the same time that it highlighted the willingness of Catalan institutions to direct a sustained mission to further peace.

The draft Bill approved by the government explicitly reiterates the origins of the ICIP as being a result of social demand and that the intention of the institute is to become one of the various different social expressions of the peace movement existing in Catalonia and to support and complement them. The social milieu associated with activity, reflexion and action for peace has a long tradition in Catalonia and is currently represented in a highly heterogeneous way by a wide range of organizations and collectives.

The process of setting up the ICIP merits a relatively in-depth reflexion on the type of relations established between the ICIP and the social movement for peace in Catalonia. This is the purpose of this report.

A conceptual framework was firstly established for analysing as precisely as possible the process of institutionalization being dealt with here without having to resort to any derogatory point of view often used in the literature on social movements in relation to this type of process. The setting up of the ICIP entails important challenges and may create opportunities for participative governance that could provide a place for critical collective action networks working in the sphere of peace.

An attempt has been made below to classify the various actors in the peace network in Catalonia. An analysis of the movement was made on the basis of two aspects: the degree of institutionalization and the central importance of peace in each organization’s activity. In this regard, a chart of the actors was prepared that includes both of these aspects and the position of the various actors in relation to these aspects. The chart displays the possible relations between the actors and the ICIP, especially in the period prior to the definitive setting up of the Institute.

The fieldwork that was carried out (fifteen in-depth interviews that were carried out online with experts and participants in the peace movement) is given below. Analysis of the interviews that were carried out, together with the actors chart, makes it possible to model the relationship between the ICIP and the peace movement. The analysis deals with issues referring to how the different actors in the peace movement view the ICIP, their expectations in relation to the same, and how they intend to relate to it.

1 The advisory and participatory body in Catalonia for promoting peace.
The following section has a twofold function: on the one hand, it describes the process of the ICIP being formed, with special emphasis on the role of the various collectives involved (parties, NGOs and movements) and, on the other, a comparison is made between the ICIP and two Catalan Government agencies with similar characteristics, the Consell General de la Joventut de Catalunya\textsuperscript{2} and the Institut Català de les Dones.\textsuperscript{3} The comparison enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the best and worst practices in the relations between institutions, parties and social movements in this type of institutionalization process.

Finally, the last section concludes the report with several recommendations regarding relationship modelling between the future Institute and the Catalan peace movement. We would like to express our gratitude for the co-operation and patience of all of the interviewees, a list of whom is provided in the appendix at the end.

\section*{2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE INSTITUTIONS}

In order to define a relationship model between the Catalan peace movement and the future International Catalan Institute for Peace, it is first necessary to delimit the meaning of the term \textit{social movement}, which is always controversial. As will be seen further on, a very broad conception has been adopted, the mainstay of which is the classical literature on social movements. An approach to the phenomenon of social movements is also made with special emphasis on their relations with institutions and their involvement in the political sphere, although with less emphasis on other aspects that are also fundamental in the activity of social movements (such as the establishing of a counter-culture, values, etc.), as this would divert the aim of this research.

Secondly, in order to establish a conceptual framework for the study, a review is made of the debates that start off institutionalization processes of the type of movement being dealt with here. The nature of these processes is briefly discussed, with recent contributions in political science being used for this, instead of other more simplistic conceptions (Prujt, 2003; Jiménez, 2005; Kriesi, 2001). Institutionalization is a complex phenomenon that, \textit{per se}, is neither positive nor negative for the development of social movements, although it does present a whole series of challenges that are analysed in this report. Our attempts to offer appropriate answers are also provided.

Finally, the description of the conceptual framework is rounded off with remarks concerning the study to set up the ICIP and its prospective relations with the Catalan peace movement from the perspective of critical networks, more especially so as this is an innovative and pragmatic way to analyze the relations between movements and institutions in the governance of a complex society as exists in Catalonia.

\subsection*{2.1. An operative definition of the concept of \textit{social movement}}

Social movements can be defined in many different ways. According to Pastor (2002), a social movement is distinguished by the fact that it emerges in conditions of conflict and becomes a challenge to the authorities or powers-that-be through collective, non-institutionalized action, it seeks to promote change, and it involves the participation of a significant number of people. Gomà and Martí (2002) define a \textit{social movement} as being a mobilising collective political actor.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2} Catalan General Council for Youth
\item \textsuperscript{3} Catalan Institute for Women
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(and, therefore, a participatory sphere) that pursues objectives for change through actions (that are generally non-conventional) and that, to do so, act with a certain degree of continuity, a high level of symbolic integration and few specific functions, at the same time that it feeds off of variable forms of action and organization. A social movement is therefore an influential and persuasive actor that challenges the dominating interpretations of different aspects of reality.

Conflict, defiance, change and collective action in the public sphere are basic ideas that distinguish a social movement from an NGO or a political party, although these types of organization may form part of a social movement, together with other types of collectives. For example, the Aturem la Guerra! Platform is a peace movement organization that brings together, in addition to a large number of collectives and individuals, NGOs such as Sodepau and political parties such as ERC, ICV and EUiA.

Some authors consider it necessary to distinguish between the concept of social movement and that of political protest, which is broader. This offers a more delimited definition that is very useful in associating social movements and public institutions, as seen further on. Jiménez (2005) defines social protest as the "collective public action of non-state actors in favour of a common interest excluded from the decision-making process". The main aim of the protest is to influence the actors with power (the authorities), whose action may depend on including within the decision-making process interests that are being defended. The process whereby protest is becoming more standard and increasingly legitimized means that more and more actors resort to it, even at the institutional level. According to Jiménez, the specific nature of the social movement concept, in comparison with the concept of protest, lies in two essential qualities: on the one hand, the ultimate and inherent goal of a social movement is to change the social order (or oppose change to this order) and, on the other, social movements are based on a widespread network of relations between groups and individuals that share a collective identity. In this respect, some analysts consider that demonstrations against the war in Iraq, at the crucial point between February and May 2003, were more a protest phenomenon than a social movement (Bonet and Ubasart, 2004). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the peace movement had a lot to do with these "protests".

Jiménez (2005:20) thus defines social movements as an informal network of interactions between a number of groups (more or less structured) and individuals that, on the basis of a joint collective identity, have the aim of bringing about social change (for example, world peace and the end of armies, in the case of the peace movement). This means that the ideas of network and identity are also main elements for dealing with the study of social movements. The last heading in this section again takes up the network idea, applied in this case to the relations between movements and institutions.

The importance of interaction with political institutions is evident and this relation, once the initial conflict stage has been overcome, may result in scenarios in which negotiation becomes possible. What happens with this aspect, however, when dealing with institutionalization processes?

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4 Stop the War! platform
1 From this viewpoint, mention can also be made of the demonstrations by the Spanish Right (associated with the Conservative PP party) against homosexual marriage and in favour of the Ebro water conveyance project and the compulsory teaching of religion in schools during the current legislature (2004-2008). On the other hand, all anti-terrorist demonstrations promoted by political governments (irrespective of their character) are markedly institutional. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the distinction made by Adell (2003) between support demonstrations and protest demonstrations. Finally, these mass meetings would also fit into Tilly's concept of counter-movement (2002), conceived as a response by the dominant classes to movements that threaten their interests.
2.2. The process of setting up the ICIP: towards a flexible institutionalizing of the Catalan peace movement?

When it is said that a movement is becoming institutionalized, reference is often directly being made to the fact that it gives much more importance to aspects such as dialogue with public institutions, to the detriment of actions that tend more towards confrontation. What makes a social movement, however, is the maintaining of collective action by the actors that constitute the movement and the challenges made to the opponents. When these challenges are not maintained, what often happens is that more isolated forms of resistance remain, which are insufficient to set up a social movement. When the challenge is maintained over time, debate ensues whether specific goals for the movement are to be achieved or positions of confrontation adopted. In short, it is a question of either maintaining relations with institutions and, at the same time, entering into negotiation and decision-making processes with the opposition (with the risk of the movement's stance being weakened in terms of defiance and presence), or not doing so and running the risk of becoming isolated and sectarian, which is also a threat to these movements (Tarrow, 2004: 289).

From a different theoretical perspective and as a result of his direct knowledge of militancy and the progressive institutionalization of certain movements in the Netherlands during the seventies, Hans Pruijt (2003) considers that relations between the State and social movements can be either repressive or inclusive. With regard to the latter, there are two types: institutionalization and co-option. These are often confused, which leads to many errors in relation to this matter, so a definition of both is given below.

a) Co-option. According to López, Echat et al. (2006), co-option basically consists of the embodiment and normalization of some of the movement's demands, which, at the same time, means the loss of its initial force of protest.

Co-option has ambivalent effects, meaning that, on the one hand, there is a certain process of demobilization (for two reasons: some of the movement's leaders are attracted by new opportunities, while the more radical sectors are more harshly suppressed) and, on the other, new political opportunities are created for the social mobilization of certain sectors of the population, as the citizens as a whole see that the State "resolves" problems by making concessions to an antagonistic movement. This would be the case, according to certain authors (Ricard Martínez, 2004), with the local neighborhood movement in the seventies and eighties in Catalonia. In effect, by taking responsibility for just the main alternatives expressed by the street demonstrations in Barcelona, Sabadell, Girona and various other cities (democracy, workers' rights, neighbourhood infrastructure, etc.), the elite layers of society were able to ensure their political and economic survival although it did signify the absolute transformation of the Francoist political regime and the entry of some leaders of the local neighborhood movement into municipal institutions (Xavier Domènech, 2004).

b) Institutionalization. This can be defined as the movement becoming channelled into a stable pattern based on regulations and formal laws. Institutionalization implies a loss of identity (Castells, 2001) and a change in the action repertoire (Kriesi, Koopmans et al., 1995). Institutionalization may arise when either the State or the movement itself takes the initiative. In the case of the State doing so, institutionalization either seeks to integrate a movement that enjoys considerable social acceptance or reduce the political costs of suppression as a formula for eliminating the movement (Platt, 1980).
Another type of institutionalization is that which expresses the social movement's own will. In this case, there are three classes of motivation that push movements towards becoming institutionalized:

1. Economic necessity (Cherki, 1973). This could apply to movements spurred on by the priority of redistribution, such as the local neighborhood movement in the 1970s.

2. Either the harshness of repression or the movement's own weakness. A context where there is a sensation of defeat, as in the mid-1980s in Spain, may push movements to begin to use institutionalized processes in order to satisfy their demands more effectively.

3. The movement's ideological moderation. According to Lowe (1986), some movements exchange their initial approach of social transformation and break-up for others that tend more towards reform and the patient achievement of goals. This is the case, for example, with the development co-operation movement.

There has been a tendency in the theory of social movements to view institutionalization as a "negative" process. The majority of studies warn of the dangers involved in these processes in relation to the necessary autonomy of social movements. However, do all institutionalization processes have the same results?

According to Kriesi et al. (1995), institutionalization can be understood, within the theory of mobilization cycles, as being the intermediate stage between protest and reform. Castells (2001) places institutionalization in the decline of the social movement. Other authors, on the other hand, assert that, in institutionalization processes, there often remains a radical wing of the movement that continues to make use of disruption and that is complemented by the institutionalized wing (Tarrow, 1997). To deal with this dilemma, it is our opinion that the distinction established by Pruijt (2003) between terminal institutionalization and flexible institutionalization is wholly appropriate.

Terminal institutionalization can be defined as a process whereby a particular movement becomes ideologically more moderate, loses its signs of identity and becomes integrated into the institutional sphere in order to achieve its goals.

Flexible institutionalization, on the other hand, envisages the institutionalization of the movement's moderate wing (for any of the three reasons explained above) and the maintaining of a radical and disruptive wing. A relation of complementariness then takes place between these two wings. The movement continues to progress forwards in its aims and maintain active tension at the same time that it acquires legal and economic resources from, and legitimacy in the eyes of, the authorities.

**2.3. The ICIP and critical networks**

To finish off this brief conceptual framework, which will help to guide the reader through the analysis, a concept which is already a classic in the analyses carried out by the social movements unit of the Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques 6 is introduced, namely, that of critical collective action networks (hereinafter, "critical networks"). Peláez (2006:6) defines a critical network as:

6 IGOP, Institute of Government and Public Policies
"the complex of relations between political and social actors that, including different degrees of ideological radicalism and organizational formalization, creates widespread opportunities or space for mobilization, introduces new forms of discourse and diversifies participatory strategies by having an inevitable influence on public policies".

According to this approach, there are four elements that help to characterize the critical network concept: firstly, the network's potential to have a bearing on the scope of public policies, from the governance point of view (consciously or unconsciously, these networks create mobilization opportunities that result in the establishment of real channels of influence and impacts); secondly, the capability of networks to raise new issues and renewed approaches within the social and political arena; thirdly, the morphology of networks, which is more complex than that of the traditional political actors (the networks include social movements); and finally, networks use symbolism as a key element to influence public policy.

The analytical proposal that associates this concept with the aims of this study consists of the process of setting up the ICIP being considered as one of the clearest forms of a critical network. Critical networks, according to this point of view, would be the space where social movements interact with other actors within the scope of governance in post-industrial societies. The concepts of social movement and critical network are different but not mutually exclusive. In fact, they both correspond to different moments in time of, and ways of looking at, collective action phenomena. The ICIP would thus be a "moment in time" – which tends to become increasingly stabilised – of maximum connexion between the Catalan peace movement and the political institutions. The study of prospective actions by the ICIP and their impact on Catalan society, as well as the study of the interactions between institutions and movements that are created through the Institute, would also need to be dealt with from this network perspective. One should not lose sight of the fact that the setting up of the ICIP is being made possible by the involvement of certain entities and individuals in the peace movement and actors at the institutional level. In the words of Sabatier and Jenkins (1993), "the existence of an advocacy coalition between sectors of the movement and institutions has made it possible to set up this Institute". In terms of this network perspective, one of the prerequisites to ensure the political and social impact of the ICIP, once it is set up, will be to maintain this dynamic.

3. THE CATALAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE ICIP

3.1. The actors chart

The Catalan pacifist movement came into existence in the 1980s. The conditions that gave rise to the movement at this time were the international context of the Cold War, the popular rejection of Spain's entry into NATO, the influence of European pacifist movements and the existence of a growing pacifist awareness among the Catalan population, together with the coming together of particular individuals and organizations in the peace movement in Catalonia. The origins of the movement were the Christian peace groups that appeared during the height of the Franco period, such as Pax Christi, Amics de l'Arpa and the first conscientious objectors (Prat, 2006). The movement has grown since then: during the 1980s, it was greatly spurred on by the demonstrations in support of a No to the national referendum on NATO; in the 1990s, by protests against the Balkans war and by the anti-national and community service movement,
and more recently, by the large demonstrations against the war in Iraq (2003 and 2004) in a context of neoliberal globalization and the global war against terrorism.

Right from its origins, the Catalan peace movement has been distinguished by a wide range of actors of different political and ideological traditions that have opted for different organizational models and developed towards a generally higher level of institutionalization. The limits of the Catalan peace movement, however, have been blurred in relation to the organizations that belong to it, and a series of questions arise: where does the peace movement start and end? Is there only one political and ideological conception of the term *peace*? Does *peace movement* mean the same as *pacifist movement*? Are development organizations peace organizations? How much does an organization need to be involved in peace matters in order to be considered part of the peace movement? While all of these questions are not dealt with in this report, they do however need to be highlighted in order to show how difficult it is to establish clear limits when defining the actors in the peace movement in Catalonia.

As a starting point and for the purposes of this report, the actors considered to form part of the Catalan peace movement are the entire membership of the *Federació Catalana d’ONG per la Pau*\(^7\), together with others that, although not belong to the Federation, have played a leading role in peace demonstrations in Catalonia in the course of their history. This selection obviously has clear limitations and leaves out collectives that, being involved to a greater or lesser degree, have taken part in peace processes at both the regional and global levels, and at the same time includes others with peace activities that are more tangential. It is our opinion, however, that these limits have to do with the diffuse nature of the movement itself and with the difficulty of establishing a clear boundary between the groups in the movement and those outside of it.

On the basis of the established classification, the peace movement in Catalonia has been analysed from two perspectives: the degree of collective institutionalization and the central nature of the issue of peace in the activity carried out by each organization. In this regard, an actors chart was produced that includes both of these, together with the various actors. The chart obviously has certain limitations: the groups that emerge from this classification are not homogeneous and there are differences among them that are also highlighted in the report; nevertheless, we consider this to be a good approach for defining the actors that make up the peace movement in Catalonia and it is also expedient for defining how they perceive the ICIP, what their expectations are in relation to the Institute and how they intend to relate with it.

The actors chart was drawn up from a series of online interviews with prominent individuals in the Catalan peace movement and those who have played a leading role in the process of defining the ICIP. In addition, a documentary analysis was made of texts, materials and documents belonging to the organizations included in the chart in order to place them on the chart.

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\(^7\) Catalan Federation of NGOs for Peace
ACTIVISTS' CHART OF THE CATALAN PEACE MOVEMENT

Graph 1: Activists' chart of the catalán peace movement
From the analysis of the data provided in the actors’ chart, the Catalan peace movement can be said to be made up of three main groups:

1. The first group is made up of organizations that are institutionalized to a high or medium degree and where peace plays a central role in their activities.

2. The second group is made up of organizations that are institutionalized to a high or medium degree and where peace plays a role of medium importance in their activities.

3. The third group is made up of organizations that are institutionalized to a medium or low degree and where peace plays a central role in their activities.

Within each group, especially the first and the third, there are considerable differences with regard to the degree that organizations falling into these groups are institutionalized. In group 1, some organizations are highly institutionalized in comparison with others; on the other hand, in group 3 there are some organizations that are practically non-institutionalized, whereas others are institutionalized to a medium degree. It is important to bear these aspects in mind when interpreting the chart and to be very aware of the lack of homogeneity of the collectives included in each group.

From a more detailed analysis of the groups, it can be seen that all of the entities that make up group 1 are members of the Federació Catalana d’ONG per la Pau, except for the Escola Cultura de Pau and the Fundación Cultura de Paz, the latter having been set up recently by Federico Mayor Zaragoza. This group includes organizations that have been very involved in the process of defining the ICIP, such as the Fundació per la Pau and Justícia i Pau, to mention the most important. All of the actors in this group are therefore familiar with the ICIP project because they took part in its launching, even though this may have been merely as members of the Federació Catalana d’ONG per la Pau. Emphasis does however need to be put on the differences in the degree to which the different actors in this group are institutionalized. Some are clearly associated with international institutions, as in the case of the Centre Unesco de Catalunya, the ANUE (Association of the United Nations in Spain) and the Escola Cultura de Pau (connected with the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), while other actors are institutionalized to a medium degree, such as Justícia i Pau, Fundació per la Pau, Universitat Internacional per la Pau and the Federació Catalana d’ONG per la Pau.

Group 2 is made up of organizations that are institutionalized to a medium or high degree and where peace plays a role of medium importance in their activities. All of the organizations in this group belong to the Federació Catalana d’ONG per la Pau, except for CEDRE (Coordinadora d’ONG de les Comarques Gironines i l’Alt Maresme), and they are somewhat familiar with the setting up of the ICIP. As members of the Federació Catalana d’ONG per la Pau, most of the actors in this group have followed the process in which the Institute was defined, although the subject of peace is not the main focus of their activities.

The majority of the organizations in group 3 do not belong to the Federació Catalana d’ONG per la Pau. If they do, it is in the capacity of observers, except for the Servei d’Informació de l’Objecció Fiscal, which is a full member. Within this group, a distinction needs to be made between the organizations that are institutionalized to a medium degree (that receive grants and have regular contact with the institutions) and those that are institutionalized to a low degree.

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8 School for Peace Culture
9 Foundation for Peace
10 Justice and Peace
11 War tax resistance information service
(with hardly any or no contact with public institutions and, in some cases, an anti-institutional discourse). This group is distinguished by the fact that it has hardly participated (or has not participated at all) in the process of defining the ICIP. Organizations that are institutionalized to a medium degree (Dones x Dones, Forces de Pau no Violentes, etc.) therefore know about the ICIP project and have participated in some of the meetings to define the Institute, whereas other actors (such as the Plataforma Aturem la Guerra, the Xarxa d'Enllaç amb Palestina, etc.) know very little or nothing at all about the proposal.

On the basis of this classification, the next section deals with the issues that refer to the way in which these actors perceive the ICIP, their expectations in relation to the Institute, and how they intend to relate to it. The analysis will permit proposals for relationship models to be made, which will need to be taken into account by the Institute.

3.2. Views and expectations

The way in which the actors that make up the peace movement in Catalonia perceive the ICIP and their expectations in relation to the Institute are determined mainly by two variables: the degree to which these actors are institutionalized and the central importance of the issue of peace in their activities. The degree to which they are institutionalized, as pointed out in point 2, makes it possible to analyse the importance given by the actors to dialogue with public institutions, the degree to which they relate to these institutions and work that is carried out jointly. The central importance of the issue of peace enables the link between the entities and the peace movement to be clearly outlined.

The more institutionalized an actor is (as would be the case with the collectives included in groups 1 and 2 identified in the actors chart), the more closely linked it will be to an institution like the ICIP; likewise, the more important the issue of peace is (as is the case with the collectives in groups 2 and 3), the more intensely it will need to establish relations with the Institute, as it is an entity that is solely dedicated to the issue of peace. These assumptions however cannot be taken for granted without taking into consideration the dialectic relation between the two variables: the organizations that are more institutionalized and where peace plays a more central role are in group 1; these organizations are the ones that are more closely connected with the ICIP project, have participated in the process of drawing up the proposal and have a good understanding of the work that the Institute will be able to carry out on the basis of the principles approved in its statutes. On the other hand, the organizations that make up groups 2 and 3, in spite of the high degree to which those in group 2 are institutionalized and the central importance of the issue of peace in the latter, are situated further away from the ICIP because of the fact that there is no direct relation between the two variables.

In conclusion, the more institutionalized actors are not always among those that are most involved in the project, and not all the actors for whom the issue of peace is of central importance to their activity have the same degree of knowledge of the initiative. It is the dialectic between the degree to which they are institutionalized and the central importance of the issue of peace that determines their knowledge of the ICIP and their degree of association with the project.
3.2.1. How the actors view the ICIP

In general, the actors that make up the peace movement in Catalonia have a positive perception and vision of the ICIP. Although some may either be somewhat more favourable or sceptical, no organization holds that the ICIP’s existence will be negative for the movement.

The organizations that are more in favour of the existence of the ICIP, which are those in groups 1 and 2, tend to state that the setting up of an institute of these characteristics will enhance the movement, because from now on there will be an institution that will have a far-reaching effect on their discourse, actions, demands, etc. and be able to access the media and public institutions more easily. It is felt that the magnitude of the ICIP, in terms of both funding and human resources, will enable its activity to have a greater social, political and media impact than social organizations could have:

"The fact that there is an important institution, which has credibility, with a certain influence and projection that is devoted to peace automatically reinforces all of those who are working for peace and it [also] gives them greater credibility." Jordi Armadans, director of Fundació per la Pau.

"I think it will be to its advantage [in reference to the peace movement], because it will provide tools to work with, it will give it the information that it hasn't always had and which is necessary for specific campaigns." Arcadi Oliveres, president of the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau.

It is also considered that ICIP may serve as an umbrella organization for the different actors in the peace movement as it will become a meeting point for debate and the exchange of ideas:

"The Institute needs to be an umbrella organization that helps research [...] [as well as] being an alternative source of economic support." Vicenç Fisas, director of the Escola Cultura de Pau.

"As a model, instead of creating a white elephant, it is more the idea of an umbrella institution that, by taking into consideration those that already exist and what is already being done, obviously does the things that aren't being done and gives them more impetus, without being autistic in relation to what is actually going on around it." Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau.

Attitudes that are more sceptical in relation to the setting up of the ICIP are found in the organizations that make up group 3; these actors are institutionalized either to a medium or low degree and therefore their relation with public institutions is either unimportant or non-existent.

It is in this group where the most reticent positions are to be found with regard to the setting up of the Institute; examples are the attitude of Coordinadora Tarragona Patrimoni per la Pau and, in certain aspects, that of the Peace Brigades International. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that, despite the fact that some of the organizations in group 3 know very little about the ICIP, the majority are well disposed towards a proposal of these characteristics:

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12 Coordinating Committee of the Tarragona Peace Heritage
“So why didn't you participate?” [Question by the interviewer]
“Not because it’s not interesting, because we think it is (because we believe it may very directly touch on what we're doing), but because nobody mentioned anything about it to us.” Marc Jamal from the Xarxa d’Enllaç amb Palestina.

“I personally find the idea interesting; the thing is that I'm at a point, both personally and politically, where I take many precautions in relation to certain institutional things.” Pilar Massana, from PASI (Plataforma Aixequem les Sancions a l'Iraq) and Aturem la Guerra!

“We have related with the ICIP from the outside. More than anything, because the relation is still being created and may change. The stance adopted by the ICIP is neither clear nor definitive [...]. Once the project was presented and the office opened to set up the ICIP, they got in contact with us about the seminar event and I thought it was an interesting idea.” Fermín Rodrigo Lázaro from the Peace Brigades International.

Despite the positive view of the ICIP held by the majority of the actors that make up the Catalan peace movement, however, there are fears concerning how the initiative may develop and how it might affect the movement. In fact, all the organizations that make up group 1 and those in groups 2 and 3 express some type of concern, of which there can be said to be three types: the fear of an increase in the degree to which the movement is institutionalized, the fear that the movement's practices become absorbed or replaced; and the fear of partisan use of the project.

With regard to the fear that there is an increase in the degree to which the movement is institutionalized, some of the interviewees consider that the fact that the Institute has important economic and human resources may co-opt certain sectors of the peace movement and, as a result, end up weakening the movement itself. In the majority of cases, such analyses express a certain distrust towards public institutions and their capacity to influence the movement and weaken its action and discourse:

“When something becomes institutionalized and it has more resources and is more powerful, then there is obviously the danger that it will have more capacity and a more far-reaching effect on the peace movement itself, and this has happened to us with all of the institutions.” Montserrat Cervera from Dones x Dones.

“I'm frightened that, over the course of different governments, what will happen is 'We'll do it all and we'll do it from inside the system', which will mean a loss of spontaneity [...]. I don't agree with so much tutelage.” Àngels Mataró, director of the ANUE.

“In principle, we don't consider ourselves to be associated with the project; we'll monitor the matter with a certain degree of scepticism and somewhat fearful in regard to what it may entail in terms of the institutionalizing of the movement and, you never know, possible manipulation.” Josep Maria Yago, from the Coordinadora Tarragona Patrimoni de la Pau.
"It's a good initiative and, in any case, care needs to be taken that it doesn't get swallowed up, institutionalized – in the worst sense of the word – in a very short time." Pilar Massana, from Aixequem les Sancions a l'Iraq and Aturem la Guerra.

Certain interviewees expressed their apprehension regarding the possibility of the ICIP ending up carrying out tasks already being undertaken by other actors in the Catalan peace movement. The interviewees put particular emphasis on the fact that the Institute needs to bring together what is already being done in Catalonia in relation to the issue of peace and enhance it and, under no circumstance, should it either repeat or copy the practices already being applied:

"When an initiative of this type is set up, one that is ambitious, that has possibilities of obtaining resources from the Administration, the one thing that it mustn't do is suffocate work and initiatives that already exist or overlap. That's to say, what it needs to do – taking into account what is already there – is to try and assess the quality of the things being done and, if there are things that are being done well, not to trample on them. Secondly, the setting up the Institute need not signify, to use an economic term, the hostile takeover of other organizations [...] such as ours." Vicenç Fisas, director of the Escola Cultura de Pau.

"Personally, what I am most concerned about is the link between what the ICIP will do and what the present organizations are already doing [...] How can we avoid overlapping? How can one be stopped from encroaching on the sphere of influence of the other? This is perhaps the part that will be most difficult to maintain, more because of the fact of not overlapping than because of any contradiction in the way that things are done." Arcadi Oliveres, president of the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau.

"One thing that other institutes have not done, and this one may do – I don't believe that it will, but it's early days and it could do – is to end up replacing some of the things that the social movements do." Tica Font, vice-president of Justícia i Pau.

Finally, one other fear expressed by several of the interviewees is the possible partisan use of the initiative once it is in operation. As is mentioned further on, one of the most highly assessed elements in the eyes of the actors in the Catalan peace movement is the independence of an Institute like the ICIP from political parties. The possibility of this point ultimately going off the rails is another of the interviewees' fears:

"Depending on who it's lead by, it will go in one direction or another." Tica Font, vice-president of Justícia i Pau.

"Sometimes these things become politicized in a partisan way, they can be used in exchange for favours and this is when I start to get wary [...] They are just fears, however; I haven't seen anything to indicate this [...] Partisanship would be the danger." Pilar Massana, from Aixequem les Sancions a l'Iraq and Aturem la Guerra.

"What may happen is that, in time, it inadvertently becomes more controlled. I believe that the Institute needs to be more transparent, so it can be seen that there is no party behind it." Àngels Mataró, director of the ANUE.

"It depends on how things go; it will also depend a lot on the correlation of governmental forces in Catalonia at each moment in time. It would be interesting
for the Institute to be independent enough irrespective of [the political inclination of] each government in power.” Fermín Rodrigo Lázaro, from the Peace Brigades International.

One of the elements of the ICIP that is most highly appraised by the Catalan peace movement is the Institute's autonomy relative to the political parties. The interviewees believe that is an important new development in relation to other initiatives of this type. At the same time, they consider it to be a triumph of the movement:

"We were convinced that the central aspect of the ICIP – that the Government would commit to non-governmental control of the institution – was bound to be dropped and, in fact, in the initial conversations we had with Saura and his team, there was a serious problem in understanding the whole issue. Deep down, they understood it to be a [kind of] board concerned with peace issues more than an institution of this type, although, with the work that we did, they either thought better of it or allowed themselves to be persuaded because their anxieties in relation to this issue dissipated, to the point now that the institutional design that's been defined is really good - there is an office that is governmental, which will give grants and carry out activities, and it is accepted that the Government will disappear from the ICIP, once it is set up.” Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau.

"For me, the most interesting thing about this Institute is that it has the vocation of not being institutional, of not being a body dependent on the institutions, but autonomous, in spite of the close link it has with Parliament [...]. And I don't believe that the Institute will try to, or even can, replace any of the relations between the entities in the peace movement. I believe that the fact that there is an institution that is somehow autonomous, even though it may be very involved in Parliament and the Government of Catalonia and these give it a lot of support, can be useful.” Montserrat Cervera, from Dones x Dones.

"The positive side of the statutes is that it won't be governmental. This is an important element.” Tica Font, vice-president of Justícia i Pau.

With regard to the way the actors interviewed regard the setting up of the ICIP, all of them agreed on the point of the direct link between the launching of the ICIP and the rise in the peace movement in the last cycle of demonstrations. In the opinion of the interviewees, although the project to set up the ICIP does go back to a period prior to the large demonstrations against the war in 2003 and 2004, these mass meetings undoubtedly gave an essential boost to the project, without which there would be no talk today of the Institute's existence:

"I think it's really clear about the demonstrations. There is a before and after in many things, but in this it's very clear. And for me it clearly has to do with whether the social movements are capable of influencing policy or not. Another thing is whether you have one hundred per cent control over the impact or if it's not what you expected or initially wanted, but what is clear is that, without the massive demonstrations against the war in Iraq, we would probably not be talking about this today.” Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau.

"The Iraq demonstrations took place in February 2003 and the Strengthening of Peace Act dates from October or November 2003. So if you look at the dates, you'll see that there is a certain coincidence that I'm sure led to Parliament – which, on
the other hand, had a Conservative (Convergència) majority, because it was still the legislature of Jordi Pujol – passing a Strengthening of Peace Act.” Arcadi Oliveres, president of the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau.

“So there was this unpleasant event, which was positive, which was the war in Iraq. The people took to the streets […], and that meant a change in attitude, and the Act was passed unanimously, you could say; it was in the last plenary session of the legislature, the last one when I was there. I say this because it has its importance, because both the ICIP and the Catalan Council depend on and were created under this Act.” Joan Surroca, from Justícia i Pau in Girona.

In conclusion, the way that the different actors in the Catalan peace movement view the ICIP is positive in general, although they do express certain fears with regard to how the project may develop (such as the possibility of the movement becoming institutionalized, the activities of peace organizations being absorbed, and the partisanship of the Institute). In any event, the interviewees express their affinity with the project and appraise the Institute’s partisanship independence as one of the most positive elements, at the same time that they link the origins of the proposal with the last cycle of demonstrations against the war in Iraq.

3.2.2. The mission of the ICIP

This report is very much an exercise in prediction, in the sense that we are trying to establish the relations between an institute that still has not come into existence and a movement that, by definition, will be changeable, alive and unpredictable. It is not possible however to trust in the old art of prophecy, and so we decided that it would be appropriate to systematize the replies given by different people in the Catalan peace movement in the interviews on their expectations concerning the setting up of the ICIP. These contain the interviewees’ impressions regarding what they think the Institute should do, how it should be run, and the work that they consider it should carry out.

In spite of the fact that documents prior to this report already deal with the subject of the strategic definition16 of the prospective Institute, we believe that it is worthwhile to contribute to this with more opinions, especially those of the actors who have been less involved in the process of setting up the ICIP, which are those defined as group 3 in the actors chart (organizations that are institutionalized to a low degree and where the issue of peace is of central importance in their activities).

While section 3.2.1 above deals with what in prior reports is termed the ICIP’s vision, this section sets out and organizes the diversity of positions regarding the ICIP’s mission: in the opinion of the people interviewed, what comparative advantages can the ICIP offer? What do they think the ICIP should not do? This breakdown of the opinions of the actors interviewed regarding what a peace institute should be may orient relationship modelling between the movements, NGOs and the Institute itself.

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16 In addition to the draft Bill on the ICIP see the reports of the panel of experts: 29 July 2005 (inception report) and 23 February 2006 (final report).
The opinions on the ICIP are organized into six groups (which refer to both its work and composition). The opinions do not always coincide; moreover, certain aspects regarding the differences of opinion are also commented on.

1. Autonomy and political independence. Party-movement relations

All of the people who were interviewed agreed that the Institute should be autonomous and independent from the Government, the Catalan Parliament and the political parties. This opinion is shared by the people interviewed in all the organizations, irrespective of whether they are in group 1, 2 or 3 in the actors chart. Behind this desire for the autonomy of an institute that – as Tica Font reminds us – has emerged on the initiative of the peace movement lies the undercurrent of the debate on the relations between political parties and social movements:

"Another thing I would say is that this Institute has started out with the support of the social movements, because we are pinning our hopes on this Institute, which is something that hasn't happened with other public institutes." Tica Font, vice-president of Justícia i Pau.

Some quotes have already been analysed in the previous section so only the most significant comments are given on this point, on which there is total consensus:

"In the model that we proposed and which, to a certain extent, is set out to a certain degree in the Act, we can see that there are three sectors, mainly, that, either because of motivation or obligation, have the subject of peace as a fundamental issue: firstly, civil society, the social movements and NGOs; secondly, the government, with its responsibility regarding the matter and thirdly, the universities, in terms of teaching, research, etc. Our suggestion was for these three sectors to be represented on the governing board, bearing in mind the aspect of its Catalan and international nature as well." Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau.

"In my view, the Institute should have the capacity to independently analyse everything that's going on..., and the organizations and the movements could give it guidance, in a manner of speaking." Íñigo Prieto, from the Peace Brigades International.

"I think that what would be useful [...] is a bridge between the associations that work for peace and the political parties with representation in Parliament, to be able to ask questions and receive information on all the policies that are being carried out in relation, in this case, to Palestine." Marc Jamal, from the Xarxa d'Enllaç amb Palestina.

2. Responsibility, transparency and control over administration

The desire for the ICIP to be a dynamic and transparent institution that is responsible for its actions and that can be somehow overseen by the peace movement as a whole is shared by all, but it is difficult to achieve this. The fact that the future Institute will be accountable for its activity to civil society and that there will be mechanisms for transparency in administration was a point for debate with the people interviewed, although their opinions did not always coincide. Nevertheless, almost all of the interviewees insist that it should be civil society, and not the Government or Parliament that should evaluate the ICIP's administration:
"[...] that's not the ICIP's work; it's the Council's work. It is the Council for the Fostering of Peace that needs to be involved and advise the Government on certain issues, [...] because it is here where peer representation exists between Catalan society and Catalan politics." Arcadi Oliveres, president of the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau.

"The important thing is for everybody to be consulted and for everybody to have all the information, for the Institute to be well-known and for there to be social control, control by the peace movements." Fermín Rodrigo Lázaro, from the Peace Brigades International.

"From our group's point of view, it's important that it connects up the whole peace movement. The types of research that need to be carried out, the initiatives that need to be adopted and the fact that consensus is reached on them by all the peace movement..., this is an advantage [...]. It may lead to the subject of peace research, peace education and certain initiatives becoming more important and a kind of resource that is achieved more by consensus and available to everybody, without having to eliminate things that are being done by people on their own." Montserrat Cervera from Dones x Dones.

3. Complementariness and the principle of subsidiarity

The danger of the Institute's activity replacing what is already being done by NGOs, the peace movement or the universities, or that it may compete, was also discussed. The draft Bill makes it very clear that the principle of subsidiarity shall guide all activity by the ICIP and that there is therefore no intention to replace or repeat any of the peace-related measures already being undertaken by civil society in Catalonia:

"[Another issue is that of] subsidiarity and the fact of not doing anything that the others can do [...], of not doing what the movements have to do [...]. All of us in the social movement culture are aware of [...] how damaging it was for the social movements that the leaders of the local neighbourhood movement all ended up on the electoral rolls in the first municipal elections; the local neighbourhood movement was disbanded and was never the same again because it was decapitated as the result of there being no natural change-over of leaders. No social movement can handle that [...]. I believe they've understood this by setting up the Oficina de la Pau, which is something small, etc..." Rafael Grasa, chairman of the panel of experts.

Other people interviewed insist on the fact that it is necessary for the ICIP's activity to take into account the work that has been carried out for years now by other sectors of the critical network of pacifists, such as the universities and, above all, the peace movement itself:

“Secondly, the setting up the Institute need not signify, to use an economic term, the hostile takeover of other organizations [...] like ours... Our entity has been running for some years now; we started from scratch and have invested a large amount in the people, so it would be incongruous that the setting up of the Institute involved people being taken from other organizations that run relatively well [...]. And a fourth aspect is that the Institute should cover the things that are missing and that aren't being done [...]. For example, there is nobody right now giving grants for research.” Vicenç Fisas, director of the Escola Cultura de Pau.
"Just right now while it is still in its origins, there is the need to demonstrate the explicit intention that nothing will be co-opted because if not we will be making a mistake and, then, it would be better for there to be no institute at all, because we'd be overshadowing citizen initiatives. There are things that can be done from within society that can't be done from within the institution [...]. If the institution wants to replace civil society or compete with it, then we're making a mistake." Pilar Massana, from *Aixequem les Sancions a l'Iraq* and *Aturem la Guerra!*

4. A source of funding and an umbrella institution

The ICIP is seen as a good opportunity for generating resources for the critical peace network in Catalonia. The resources that can be provided by the ICIP are of different types: economic, knowledge, legitimization and political support.

Another idea emphasized by almost all of the people who were interviewed is that the Institute needs to be a kind of umbrella that protects the various activities of the critical peace network in Catalonia:

"Not the idea of duplicating everything […], but more perhaps the rather English concept of the umbrella, that can protect many different things at once." Rafael Grasa, president of the panel of experts.

"What the Institute should basically do is understand, enhance, respect and give encouragement to what emerges in civil society […]. It can serve to give more substance and economic, technical, and political support, as well as [the influence of] its name; it can serve as an umbrella; there are many ways of providing support." Pilar Massana, from *Aixequem les Sancions a l'Iraq* and *Aturem la Guerra!*

5. Research and action: interpretation of knowledge

Many people called for the ICIP to be much more than a research institute and for it to get involved directly in political action to foster peace, defend human rights and accompany peace processes. Many of those interviewed want the ICIP to make data available to the peace movement for its public awareness work and activity. However, what is called for is not an essentially academic role for the Institute, but for it to be a source of rigorous information that, with co-operation from the university, produces knowledge that can be converted into transformative social action:

"What we also need is for people to carry out thorough research that can be conveyed to us to be used however and whenever we see fit, without having to be as meticulous as the academics, because we are the ones who can transform it into the language of the street. It is here where there is a need for this institute and it can be a useful tool […]. For me, the challenge of an institute like this is in this conveyance [of information to the peace movement]. If it ultimately ends up like another CIDOB, where […] the sector being influenced by the Institute is the executive level or, in other words, top level politics, then I don't know…." Tica Font, vice-president of *Justícia i Pau*.

"Yes, [it's true], the ICIP will need to be critical with [regard to] politics […] and when coordinating with NGOs it will need to stir up people's awareness, go way beyond just the academic thing, which we all agree with." Joan Surroca, from *Justícia i Pau* in Girona.
“Exchange with countries that are much more advanced in this extreme if agreements are made with the SIPRI, if agreements can be made with study centres with more experience than us on the subject of disarmament and peace, with the Netherlands, with the Peace Research Centre... this is what opens up opportunities, and economic opportunities that we never used to get [...]. Here there is provision in the budgets for doing activities and good research.” Àngels Mataró, director of the ANUE.

“Talking to Enric Prat, for example, everything referring to the collection of data on the movement could be interesting.” Josep Maria Yago, from the Coordinadora Tarragona Patrimoni per la Pau.

“We have always said [...] that, in order for the peace movement to work, an adequate information database is needed [...] on military blocs, expenditure, the arms trade, NATO [...], because it has sometimes been lacking this background for reflexion [...]. There has been stern activism [...], but there was the need for reflexion behind it, and the ICIP will do this. Well, not just the ICIP: Vicenç Fisas has been saying the same thing for the past twenty or thirty years.” Arcadi Oliveres, president of the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau.

“[...] the attitude, the Institute’s influence, the consistency of information, support and even the technical [aspects] [...] there are many things that can be done and, of course, an institute, it can be a monitoring institute of wars, struggles, new actors, the increasing influence of the issue of human rights violations by the national state, the influence of globalization in all of this [...], resistance, new tools [...]. Of course, it all depends on the people who run it [...], as long as it doesn’t turn into a political struggle for influence. That’s something that must be avoided.” Fermín Rodrigo Lázaro, from the Peace Brigades International.

6. Representation and maximum political scope in the Institute’s composition

Finally, a series of considerations are presented concerning the wish for the ICIP to be as varied as possible in terms of political composition. We believe this to be the guarantee of non-partisanship and would, at the same time, be a good contribution towards achieving a flexible degree of institutionalization as explained in section two of this report. Mention is also made in this section of the need for a generational change in the Catalan peace movement, which was expressed by the people interviewed. Some of the actors in the critical peace network who have participated in a more tangential way in the process, or who weren’t even called [to take part], made the following comments:

“What I’m most concerned about is that it will be too reserved or that it will be the same old people again, which has often been a problem. It's not a break with the past, but Catalonia is a small place and, at the same time, in the world of NGOs [...], [there's the thing of] "let's see which hat I wear today": today I'm in favour of peace, in favour of human rights and, we're egocentric, you know..., there's a point in which I see that everything is linked to the same old people (who are great people when it comes down to it: Arcadi, Grasa, Armadans, etc.). They're the ones who have always been working on this issue.” Àngels Mataró, director of the ANUE.
"For me it's complicated. If there was something that came out of the seminar event, it was that we are a pretty varied peace movement here in Catalonia. How does one bring all of the different feelings together, I don’t know, let's see what happens. For me, it's not a time of big demonstrations [...]. There will always be a dialectic between more institutionalization or more autonomy, independence and representation/participation.” Fermín Rodrigo Lázaro, from the Peace Brigades International.

"The key is for the governing board to be representative of the movement, because if not, there could well be the problem that it only represents one part of the movement... [...], the Federació Catalana d’ONG per la Pau, – and the word speaks for itself: they’re NGOs, they’re a sector [...], and then there’s a whole other sector lead by Aturem la Guerra! and all the associations that have come out of the anti-national and community service movement, youth movements and more local movements that aren't represented in the Federation of NGOs for Peace but that should have a foot in the ICIP's governing board.” Marc Jamal, from the Xarxa d’Enllaç amb Palestina.

4. THE PEACE MOVEMENT, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

This section deals with the relation between the social movements, political parties and institutions in the process of setting up the ICIP and defining how the Institute should be in the future to ensure that it runs well and that it achieves its aims.

This analysis is divided into two very distinctive parts. The first explains the political dynamics in the setting up of the ICIP and the role of collective political actors, in both the political parties and social movements, and stresses in particular the influence of the most recent cycle of demonstrations against globalization and war. The second part consists of an exercise in comparative politics for lessons that can be drawn for the future running of the ICIP, based on the experiences of other agencies considered to be similar to the ICIP.

4.1. Impetus to peace policies in Catalonia

The passing of the Strengthening of Peace Act (21/2003) by the Catalan Parliament on 4 July 2003 signified an important step forward in the support of the public institutions for the Catalan peace movement. The passing of the Act was the result of a long and intense process in the Parliament of Catalonia, together with the momentum of the cycle of demonstrations that began at the beginning of 2000:

“Then again, having seen the dynamics of how the ICIP has appeared, and before it the Strengthening of Peace Act, I think that while the conditions were favourable (due to the Iraq issue), it is also true that three or four deputies (members of Parliament) were working on the Bill [...], which they then promoted with everyone’s co-operation [...]. Curiously enough, the Act was passed unanimously, I believe.” Arcadi Oliveres, president of the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau.
“Then there was the whole mess of the war in Iraq and many of the things that were said had a powerful effect. The fact that Catalonia was committed to peace, that civil society was one step ahead of the Government and that, perhaps, the Government should do something [...] And in this case, we never believed that either the parties or the government would have committed to that if it hadn’t been for everything to do with the mobilization for Iraq.” Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau.

Act 21/2003 laid the foundations that would enable the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau to be set up. It came into operation in July 2005 and at the same time the process of setting up the ICIP through the International Institute for Peace Programme was set in motion. A group of representatives from the movement was involved with advisory activities through a panel of experts.

The Strengthening of Peace Act signified the institutional recognition of the work done by the peace movement in Catalonia, at the same time that it highlighted the willingness of Catalan institutions to direct a sustained mission for peace. As previously stated, the demonstrations against the war in Iraq were a determining factor in the passing of this Act and for the impetus given to peace policies in Catalonia by the public institutions.

In terms of functional organization, the Consell Català de Foment de la Pau, according to the Act that was passed, became accountable to the Catalan Government's Ministry of International Relations, which politically was in the hands of the ERC party (the left-wing Catalan nationalist party, during the 2003-2006 legislature). On the basis of this structure, the Catalan Development Cooperation Agency, which comes under the same government department, took over the helm. It was in this way that the 2003-2006 Strategic Plan for Cooperation included peace making as one of the priorities of Catalan co-operation – a line of action for which, up until that time, there had been no explicit strategy –, at the same time that a specific grant scheme was started for "peace making".

The Ministry of Institutional Relations and Participation, which politically was in the hands of the ICV-EUiA party alliance (2003-2006 legislature), then undertook the commitment to give impetus to the ICIP through the International Institute for Peace Programme and thereby to start to foster peace at the institutional level whereby support would be given to social organizations dealing with this subject. A specific scheme was also set up for grants to carry out activities to foster peace and the culture of peace.

In this respect, it can be said that, during the left-wing Tripartite alliance's first term in office, there was a certain dualism in the impetus given to peace policies in Catalonia, both from the Ministry of International Relations, under the ERC, and the Ministry of Institutional Relations and Participation, under the ICV-EUiA. This situation can be explained within the context of the important demonstrations against the war and in a favour of peace that took place during 2003 and 2004, which were mass meetings that both political formations wanted to capitalize on:

"If one were to make a party analysis, you could say that there were two races to see who could take charge of the matter and that was probably the result of bad political negotiation in the governmental agreement.17 In the long run, the issue has become more rationalized.” Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau.

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17 Translator's note: The Catalan Government of 2003-2006 was made up of a tripartite left-wing alliance.
This initial dualism has since been reduced, with the Catalan Development Cooperation Agency now promoting peace-making with the focus on the situation in the South, and the Oficina de Pau i Drets Humans\(^\text{18}\) (Ministry of the Interior, within the context of the 2006-2010 legislature) has taken responsibility for support for entities carrying out peace awareness projects and campaigns to foster peace in Catalonia:

"This is all obviously a little mixed up still but if things work out well, in three or four years time, in the Agency's co-operation projects, just as there are aspects to be borne in mind regarding gender and environmental issues, there will also be things to do with peace issues; nevertheless, it will fundamentally be the Agency that will be responsible for giving impetus to policies to foster peace and the prioritising of relations with entities that want to carry out peace. Ultimately, there is a certain order and, in terms of discourse, all of these issues can start to be dealt with in one way and end up totally different." Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau.

4.2. The ICIP: a new institutional architecture?

With this outline of the current panorama of the peace movement in Catalonia, and bearing in mind the nature of the ICIP, the following study examines the different relationship models that exist between parainstitutional agencies and social movements in other areas and sectors in Catalonia.

As to an in-depth comparative analysis of relationship modelling between existing parainstitutional agencies and related social networks, a simple analysis has been made of two bodies with very different relationship models to bring to light, in each case, the "good" and "bad" practices that can be detected through relationship modelling. The material used for this was the knowledge of the interviewees (who, as social activists and/or experts in movement issues, know or have first-hand knowledge of these agencies that, because of their legal or relational characteristics, can be compared with the ICIP).

In the interviews, in their reply to open or multiple-choice questions, the interviewees pointed above all to two institutions that can be compared to a certain extent with the ICIP: the Consell Nacional de la Joventut de Catalunya (CNJC)\(^\text{19}\) and the Institut Català de les Dones (ICD)\(^\text{20}\).

A description of these agencies is given, together with their relations with other associations. The interviewees' opinions are also provided and a table based on two series of variables: on the one hand, the legal definition of the agency and its relation with government institutions and the institutional political parties and, on the other, the nature of its relations with the peace movement social network.

The Catalan National Youth Council is, without any shadow of doubt, the body that, a priori, is the most similar to what the ICIP will become in the future. The CNJC was set up in 1979 under legislation passed by the Parliament of Catalonia and is an "independent, critical, diverse and democratic platform" (www.cnjc.cat) that brings together more than seventy youth entities all over Catalonia. It is made up of entities in different areas of education (especially recreation centres and scout groups, as well as religious entities), student and workers' unions, the young

\(^{18}\) Agency for Peace and Human Rights

\(^{19}\) Catalan National Youth Council

\(^{20}\) Catalan Institute for Women
members of the institutional political parties and cultural organizations in the broadest sense of
the word (from hiking associations to young immigrant associations).

The relation of the CNJC with the institutions is mainly economic, although the body’s structure
is totally independent from the Parliament and Government of Catalonia. The president and
governing board are elected at a general assembly of the constituent entities. The weight of the
young members of the political parties in this assembly is highly evident however, which
diminishes the political autonomy of the CNJC in terms of an umbrella institution for the youth
movement.

In fact, some of the people interviewed who consider the CNJC model to be the most similar to
the future ICIP are already alert to this danger of partisan politicization, although they do believe
that in the peace movement, where the influence of the institutional parties is much less
important, it is not so likely that this will happen:

"I believe it to be a new model in three aspects: [firstly] that of the aims and
purposes; it is [also] new in terms of the formula, because it is apparently similar to
the CNJC but it’s not, because that can be politicized much easier, in the partisan
sense, and it shouldn’t be like that – we have to avoid that --: it is the only
organization to be set up by Parliament and it doesn’t intervene afterwards,
therefore, [it's new] with regard to the organizational model, and also because of the
idea that it will be a regular meeting place, a place to seek involvement, and there
will also be problems." Rafael Grasa, president of the panel of experts.

"In the case of the Council, there is one aspect that in the ICIP can even be
improved, and that is that the young members of the political parties and
organizations associated with the political parties are in the Council [...], whereas in
the case of the ICIP it is more difficult for this to happen [...]. On paper they are not
so different; the thing is that, in the ICIP, any governmental representation that there
may be on the board would always be a minority and therefore its influential capacity
will be much less important." Jordi Armadans, director of the Fundació per la Pau.

The Catalan Institute for Women (ICD) is another agency of similar characteristics to the ICIP in
that it is associated with a social movement - in this case, feminism. The setting up of the ICD in
1985 was an important milestone in the institutionalization of a large part of feminism in the
1970s. The ICD forms part of government structure and, prior to the current legislature (2006-
2010), was attached to the Presidential Department. It currently comes under the Ministry of
Social Action and Citizen Affairs. Its relations with the institutions are therefore direct. The ICD
is the government agency that designs, promotes, coordinates and evaluates policies by
women and policies for women developed by the Catalan Administration. At the same time, the
ICD also has a line of research on gender issues and offers continuous training in a wide range
of studies.

As for the running of the ICD, the Institute defines itself as an "autonomous administrative
agency" (http://www.gencat.net/icdona/opcio3.htm). The governing board consists of a
chairperson, a director and twelve members. The members are representatives from the other
Government departments who make the Interministerial Commission for Equal Opportunities for
Women.

The participatory bodies of the ICD are a council of women that meets twice a year and a
standing committee that meets every two months. Women from any official women's association
in Catalonia can participate in these bodies.
The ICD’s close link with the Catalan Government means that a distinction can clearly be made between two stages in time in the agency’s political lineage: the first coincided with the long period when the Conservative Catalan CIU party was in power, and the second, with the stage of the progressive, left-wing, tripartite government (the so-called “consensus” government). This fact gave rise to a diversity of opinions among the people interviewed, although more than anything it shows the importance of the institutional political parties in the ICD’s development:

"Of course, there have been two stages at the Institute for Women: the previous one and the present one, which have nothing to do with each other. For me, the one now, the tripartite government, or the government of understanding which is the same thing, is much better. Firstly, the Institute's management [positions] are now filled by women from the feminist movement at the proposal of different groups in the movement that called for this: “Don’t partisanize the Institute, put women there who are from the movement and who everyone can identify with, whatever party or group we are from”. The government accepted this, which was a first gesture of cooperation [...]. In the previous stage, on the other hand, “the president” of the ICD was [a man], Jordi Pujol... This could also be interpreted in a certain way. I believe that a much greater effort has been made in the current stage to include all of the groups and to engage in dialogue with them.” Pilar Massana, from Aixequem les Sancions a l'Iraq and Aturem la Guerra!

“They (the women) have opened it up a lot, before only those with so many members could go [...]; they’re made a great effort for it to be territorial, and there are many working committees on specific issues, like health, violence [...]. The Catalan Government set up a Catalan Institute for Women and, according to whoever is in the government, more or less things can be done [...]. For example, throughout the entire period of the CIU in power, we didn't even notice they were around, in the bad sense of the word. It went well because we wanted to do things that were contrary and it was something very linked to the CIU [...]. With the change in Government, there's been more interaction [...]. I believe that one of the most important and direct new things that the Catalan Institute for Women has contributed is its commitment to and integration of the feminist movement [...], and that's positive because the feminist discourse gets transferred from the government all over Catalonia [...]. Contradiction arises when everybody starts to say the same things; that's when the movement gets confused with government [...].” Montserrat Cervera, from Dones x Dones.

"I hope it will be different, because if we end up with the parameters of the ICD..., don't make me say it, I'll say something terrible [...]. That's the big danger: the concept of this Institute will be different according to whoever's leading it. I know this from the Foundation, and [I can say that] there have been changes according to the person who has headed it, whoever won the elections and who was governing at the time.” Àngels Mataró, president of the ANUE.

Be that as it may, it seems that, in the case of the peace movement, it is not so likely that the dangers of institutionalization that are so well exemplified in these comments will occur, at least in the initial stage:

"The Peace Institute is something that is very simple; there are many women's groups that are very diverse and institutionalized, they greatly depend on grants, [...] and the activities they carry out are marked out by the grants. Things aren't all like that in the peace movement: there are many people who aren't tied to grants,
and [...] in this respect I see it much simpler." Pilar Massana, from Aixequem les Sancions a l’Iraq and Aturem la Guerra!

From the analysis of the experiences of the CNJC and the ICD, and with the information gleaned from the interviews, it can be said that the ICIP needs to be prevented from becoming the sole source of funding for the peace movement and that the presence of institutional political parties in the Institute will be detrimental to its autonomy and independence. The contents of this section are summarized in the table below. The projection of the ICIP’s prospective relations is based on documents from the period prior to the setting up of the Institute (they still do not actually exist), which means that they are more of a normative approximation than a description.

Table 1. Types of relations between the ICIP (and similar agencies) and institutions of government, parties and the social network to which it is linked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Institutions of government</th>
<th>The political parties</th>
<th>The social network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CNJC</td>
<td>Formal independence, accountability</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Economic (funding), cooption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>Comes under Ministry of Action Social, interministerial</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Economic (funding), institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICIP</td>
<td>Autonomy and independence</td>
<td>In relation to autonomy and participation</td>
<td>Umbrella, collaboration, institutionalization flexible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the authors
5. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP MODELS?

As has been emphasised throughout this report, most of the actors that make up the Catalan peace movement view the ICIP positively and, in spite of any fears that there may even be criticisms concerning certain aspects relating to the initiative, none of the actors have an attitude of frontal opposition or boycott towards the Institute. From this, it can be asserted that the ICIP project has got off to a good start in its relations with the Catalan peace movement; this is because, on the one hand, it is a proposal that has emerged from the movements themselves and, on the other, because of its defined autonomy in relation to the political parties and institutions. This good predisposition was also made evident in the seminar event on "The peace movement in Catalonia," organized by the DREP's International Institute for Peace Programme (Ministry of Institutional Relations and Participation/Government of Catalonia), held on 10 to 12 February 2006, which saw the participation of all the actors in the Catalan peace movement, from those most enthusiastic about the initiative to the most reticent.

In fact, from our analysis of the Catalan institutional puzzle, there is no public institution of a similar nature to that of the ICIP, except for the Catalan Youth Council. In the latter, however, compared to the Institute, the weight of the political parties, through their young members, is more important (this is mentioned in the analysis in the point above). From this, it can be asserted that the ICIP is an innovative institutional proposal, and its development in the coming years will, in itself, reveal the challenges and difficulties that will need to be dealt with.

From the classification established in the actors chart, it can be asserted that the organizations included in groups 1 and 2 are very predisposed to work with the Institute, due to their high degree of institutionalization. This favourable attitude was demonstrated in the interviews held with the different actors in the Catalan peace movement and especially the representatives of the organizations making up these groups.

The collectives that make up group 3, however, represent a more heterogeneous situation with regard to people’s views on the Institute. This group includes a range of actors, including those that, while not actively participating in the project, have to a certain degree monitored the initiative on a regular basis and are familiar with the most noteworthy aspects (Dones x Dones, Aixequem les Sancions a l'Iraq, and Aturem la Guerra!), others that hardly know about the proposal but are well disposed towards the issue (Xarxa d'Enllaç amb Palestina), to those actors that, although they know about it, are quite critical in relation to the initiative (Coordinadora Tarragona Patrimoni per la Pau, Peace Brigades International).

Attention needs to be focused on group 3, mainly due to the fact that group 3 actors have shown they are well disposed towards the initiative but as yet have not been included, as is the case with the Xarxa d’Enllaç amb Palestina. With regard to actors that have a more distrustful attitude concerning the ICIP, it is important to establish dialogue (as has been done so far by inviting these collectives to participate in the “The peace movement in Catalonia” seminar held at the beginning of 2007).

Although the movement’s generally positive attitude towards the ICIP is highly valuable, the fears in relation to an initiative of these characteristics also expressed by the organizations making up the Catalan peace movement should not be overlooked, and attention needs to be focused here. In this regard, as we have already pointed out, there are three particular issues that have been observed: the fear of the movement becoming increasingly institutionalized, the fear of practices being absorbed and replaced, and the fear of the project becoming politicized.
in a partisan way. The ICIP project will need to take into consideration the movement's warning in these respects and work to ensure that these fears do not materialize.

Aside from this, it is also important for the promoters of the ICIP to encompass the expectations expressed by the actors in the peace movement in relation to the Institute. As this report makes clear, the representatives of the organizations who were interviewed have drawn attention to six proposals for what they would like the ICIP to be. In specific terms, they have stated that they want it to be an autonomous Institute that is independent in both political and partisan terms; a dynamic Institute that is responsible and transparent; an Institute that carries out activities that are complementary to what is already being done (through compliance with the principle of subsidiarity); an Institute that is a source for resources (funding, knowledge, legitimacy and political support) and that serves as an umbrella for the activities of the critical network for peace in Catalonia; an Institute that not only carries out research but also is a source of political action to foster peace and an Institute that is as broad as possible in terms of its political composition.

Using the terms defined in the theoretical framework used here and avoiding the typical reticence of social movements concerning free-flowing relations between institutional politics and grass-roots transformational action, it can be said that the ICIP opens the doors to the flexible institutionalizing of the Catalan peace movement. Although public policies to foster peace take on the importance that they deserve, this institutional model guarantees the movement its autonomy. Moreover, the ICIP itself needs to be conceived as being as permeable as possible as an actor in the critical network for peace, an actor whose characteristic traits – in spite of the existence of a clear regulatory environment that governs it – are flexibility, openness and independence from the Government.

To sum up, the Catalan peace movement has shown its very clear predisposition to work and cooperate with the future International Catalan Institute for Peace, in spite of various concerns that have been expressed, and it has drawn attention to certain points of view and expectations that will need to be taken into consideration by those in charge of the Institute.
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY


## 7. APPENDICES

### 7.1. List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Where interviewed</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordi Armadans</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Fundació per la Pau</td>
<td>14/3/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xavier Badia</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Oficina de Promoció de la Pau i els Drets Humans</td>
<td>24/1/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat Cervera</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Dones x Dones</td>
<td>26/3/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicenç Fisas</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Escola Cultura de Pau</td>
<td>5/2/2007</td>
<td>UAB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tica Font</td>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>Justícia i Pau</td>
<td>7/3/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rafael Grasa</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>UAB</td>
<td>20/2/2007</td>
<td>UAB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marc Jamal</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Xarxa d’enllaç amb Palestina</td>
<td>6/4/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pilar Massana</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Plataforma Aturem la Guerra / Plataforma Aixequem les Sancions a l’Iraq</td>
<td>13/3/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
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<tr>
<td>Àngels Mataró</td>
<td>Directora</td>
<td>ANUE</td>
<td>7/5/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arcadi Oliveres</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Consell Català de Foment de la Pau</td>
<td>16/3/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enric Prat</td>
<td>Experto</td>
<td>Historian specialising in the peace movement</td>
<td>20/12/2006</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Íñigo Prieto</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Peace Brigades International</td>
<td>16/5/2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fermin Rodrigo</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Peace Brigades International</td>
<td>16/5/2007</td>
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<td>Joan Surroca</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Justicia i Pau (Girona)</td>
<td>24/3/2007</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
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<tr>
<td>Josep Maria Yago</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Coordinadora Tarragona Patrimoni per la Pau</td>
<td>25/3/2007</td>
<td>By e-mail</td>
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</table>
The International Catalan Institute for Peace and the Social Movement in Catalonia